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Atlanticism In Visegrad: 
Understanding the Relationship between 
Central Europe and the U.S. after 1989  
 
Brian S. Valdivia  
 
This thesis seeks to explore the relationship of the countries of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (together known as the Visegrad 
Group or Visegrad 4 [V4]) with the US after the fall of communism, and how 
this relationship helped them to transform their political and economic 
systems. This study will primarily focus on the years between1989-2000, as 
this was the period during which US-V4 relations were at their peak. After the 
conclusion of the Clinton presidency, US foreign policy refocused its priorities 
as the US saw Central Europe as finally part of the Atlantic world and 
therefore able to handle its affairs on its own. This close relationship between 
these Central European countries and the US can be defined in terms of 
Atlanticism, the idea that both Europe and North America prosper when 
working together to build stronger political and economic ties; a relationship 
which in many ways was integral to the success of the countries in the 
Visegrad group as it was earlier for Western Europe under the Marshall Plan.  
In this thesis, I argue that it is this relationship based on Atlanticism, in 
combination with the united regional front that these countries presented in 
coordinating their foreign policy approaches in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, which enabled them to successfully integrate into the 
economic and political structures of Europe, and in a broader sense, the 
Atlantic world. 
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Introduction 
A Rock Solid Commitment 
 On June 3, 2014, United States President, Barack Obama, 
delivered a speech in Warsaw, Poland to unveil his $1 billion security plan for 
Central Europe.1 Because of the 2014 crisis in Crimea, President Obama felt it 
necessary to remind Central Europe that the US has a “rock solid commitment” in 
making sure that the countries in this region are protected from Russian 
aggression.2 However, in order to understand exactly why the US feels this “rock 
solid commitment” to Central Europe, we must look back to 1989 after the fall of 
communism. 
Defining Atlanticism 
This thesis seeks to explore the relationship of the countries of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (together known as the Visegrad 
Group or Visegrad 4 [V4]) with the US after the fall of communism, and how this 
relationship has helped them to transform their political and economic systems. 
This study will primarily focus on the years between1989-2000, as this was the 
period during which US-V4 relations were at their peak. After the conclusion of 
the Clinton presidency, US foreign policy refocused its priorities as the US saw 
Central Europe as finally part of the Atlantic world and therefore able to handle its 
affairs on its own. This close relationship between these Central European 
countries and the US can be defined in terms of Atlanticism, the idea that both 
                                            
1 Peter Baker and Rick Lyman, “Obama, in Poland, Renews Commitment to 
Security,” The New York Times, June 03, 2014.  
2 Ibid.  
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Europe and North America prosper when working together to build stronger 
political and economic ties; a relationship which in many ways has been integral 
to the success of the countries in the Visegrad group as it was earlier for Western 
Europe under the Marshall Plan.  
In this thesis, I argue that it is this relationship based on Atlanticism, in 
combination with the united regional front that these countries presented in 
coordinating their foreign policy approaches in the last decade of the twentieth 
century, which enabled them to successfully integrate into the economic and 
political structures of Europe, and in a broader sense, the Atlantic world. For the 
Visegrad group, this success has meant that despite a rocky transition and 
ongoing concerns regarding economic growth and rising debt, three out of these 
four states, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, have joined the ranks of the 
US and the UK as high-income countries as defined by the world bank.3 All four 
countries score highly on United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), 
which indicates the potential for human development if there were no inequality, 
and on the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the actual 
measure of human development when taking inequality in society into account. In 
fact, currently, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary all outrank the US in 
this regard, with Poland following just behind.4 
                                            
3 "Country and Lending Groups," Country and Lending Groups, N.p., n.d. Web. 
08 Apr. 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-
groups#High_income.  
4 "Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building 
Resilience," Human Development Report 2014 26,1 (2014) Web, 8 Apr. 2015, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf.  
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Questions/Arguments 
In order to fully understand the relationships within and the development 
of the Visegrad Group, one must first understand the differences in their paths 
and trajectories, both before and after 1989. Therefore, we will start by examining 
the different circumstances under which each of the Visegrad countries 
integrated into the Atlantic world. In exploring which of these countries made the 
fastest and least difficult transition, which countries experienced greater growing 
pains, and identifying some of the reasons behind these smooth, or rocky, 
integrations, we may be better able to understand the political and economic 
trajectories of these countries, and their position in the wider economic and 
political picture of Europe today. 
Finally, we will need a thorough understanding of US involvement in the 
economic and political development of the Visegrad Group. We will start by 
analyzing the Clinton Administration’s attitudes, goals, and policies enacted 
during the 1990’s. Specifically we will analyze what is known as the Partnership 
for Peace (PFP) policy, which was Clinton’s way of initially bringing Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic into the Atlantic World. As we will see, due to 
certain circumstances, Slovakia would have a much tougher time breaking into 
the Atlantic World. Furthermore, to better understand the history behind the 
relationship between the Visegrad group and the US, we will explore such 
questions as “Why did Central European countries seek to ‘Return to Europe’ 
after 1989?”, “What were the main characteristics of their post-communist 
policies that helped them integrate into Western institutions?”, “How did the US 
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help bring the V4 into Western institutions?”, “What did the U.S. receive from this 
relationship?”, “What is the relationship of the V4 to the US today?” and finally 
“What was, and continues to be the role of Atlanticism in this relationship?”.  
It is also imperative that we consider the role and relationship between 
countries of the V4 today given the authoritarian turn in Hungary and the rise of 
powerful right-wing movements in the other countries of the region. Therefore, I 
have dedicated a section in the concluding chapter to briefly discuss the 
relationships among the V4 today, given the impact of rising nationalism on the 
current political climate in the region. Before diving into this thesis, we 
understand that Visegrad should not be seen as an organization that is always in 
agreement about all issues. Rather as Senior Fellow at the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, Andras Racz puts it, “Visegrad was never intended to settle 
intra-Visegrad debates… Visegrad is intended, and will remain so, to promote 
those interests in common,” most recently in response to the 2015 Syrian 
refugee crisis.5 By answering the above questions, we will have a better 
understanding of how the US helped the V4 enter into the Atlantic world through 
such acts as joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU), why the US still feels a commitment to this part of the 
world, and what the V4 means today in Central Europe.  
 
                                            
5 Wojiech Przybylski, “Visegrad Differences will always exist: But the V4 is Much 
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Significance of Research 
What is important to note is that while there is significant information on 
the relationship between the Visegrad countries and the US, few scholars have 
discussed the specific policies pursued by both sides during the years 1989 
through 2000, the peak of US-V4 relations. Political analysts Ronald D. Asmus 
and Alexandr Vondra have discussed the history of the relationship between 
Visegrad and the US, but fail to be precise when addressing the significance of 
the relationship between the US and V4.6 When visiting the Visegrad Group’s 
main website one will notice that the organization tends to downplay the support 
it received from the US and does not list any of the policies taken by the US in 
order to aid the V4. Polish diplomat Andrzej Ananicz goes so far as to say that 
the US and the Clinton Administration with its Partnership for Peace policy were 
in fact initially trying to hinder the development of the Visegrad by only offering 
partial integration into NATO.7 To respond to this kind of critique, we must 
explore more closely the policies of the Clinton presidency, as it was the Clinton 
administration that answered the plea of the Visegrad countries for economic and 
political support from the Atlantic world after the fall of Communism.  
From the perspectives of Asmus and Vondra, it would seem that the 
Visegrad countries’ futures may rely heavily on their relationship with the U.S. 
However, with relatively high unemployment rates, an aging work force, the 
                                            
6 Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, "The Origins of Atlanticism in Central 
and Eastern Europe," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18 no. 2 (2005): 
203-16.  
7 Andrzej Ananicz, “From the Anti-Communist Underground to NATO and the 
EU,” International Visegrad Fund, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/the-visegrad-
book/ananicz-andrzej-from-the.  
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inability to keep young people in country, and in the case of Hungary, an 
economy in recession even before the 2008 financial crisis, perhaps the Visegrad 
countries should look inward to reform their economies whose difficulties have 
already had social and political impacts. However, looking outward has led them 
to some degree of success in the past; by forming the Visegrad group and 
pursuing a policy of strong Atlanticism, not only did Central European countries 
seek to ensure each state’s security, but they also began a process of forming a 
strong regional bloc of states with common interests to become an increasingly 
powerful voice in the European sphere. In examining the development of the 
Visegrad Group in Central Europe and its involvement in NATO and the EU, it 
becomes clear that in helping one another during the transition process through 
economic and political cooperation and allying with the West, these states were 
able to rise from the ruins of Soviet-bloc communist systems to become the 
independent EU member states that we know today. 
 
The Big Picture 
This discussion has become increasingly relevant in light of the 2014 
Crimean and Ukrainian crises; Atlanticism has once again taken center stage, as 
old fears about Russia have once again re-emerged. US President Barack 
Obama’s security plan for Central Europe will include expanding “military training, 
joint exercises and troop rotations while pre-positioning equipment in the region 
to bolster defenses for American allies.”8 However, Polish and other Central 
                                            
8 Baker and Lyman, “Obama, in Poland, Renews Commitment to Security,” 
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European politicians have doubts about how serious President Obama is about 
committing not only money, but also troops in Central and Eastern Europe.9 This 
might have to do with the realization that the US Government, as well as the 
American public, is apprehensive about sending troops abroad after the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the amount of resources a president can offer 
a country without the support or approval of Congress is often the subject of 
domestic political contestation. In a time where bi-partisanship seems to be at an 
all time low in American politics, it will be difficult for the Obama administration to 
convince both Republicans and Democrats to agree on the situation in Crimea 
and Central/Eastern Europe. On top of all this we must also wonder how 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán’s close relationship with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin will affect this situation. Also with the newly elected 2015 
Government in Poland, who is leaning towards strengthening relations with 
Russia, we must also wonder if Poland will even want the security plan offered by 
President Obama and the US. Other questions such as how much money, how 
many advisors and how many troops the US will send will surely be heavily 
debated within Congress. Only time will tell how much of Obama’s plan will be 
implemented and whether it can be considered a success. 
With prompting from the Baltic States and former Polish government, the 
US has also placed economic sanctions on Russia in order to remind its political 
leadership that its actions in neighboring states will not go unanswered. This is 
yet another example of Atlanticism at its best, specifically in light of the 
                                            
9 Ibid. 
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reluctance of a number of European countries, including France, Germany and 
even Hungary and Slovakia, to put their economic relationships with Russia at 
too much risk.10 At this time, many European countries are heavily dependent on 
Russian oil and natural gas, and therefore in no position to take any severe 
measures that would hurt relations with Russia.11 Because of this energy 
dependency, it will be up to the US to foster a stronger relationship with the V4 
countries, as well as the rest of the EU, in order to help deter future aggression 
which would be in the interests of both the US and Central/Eastern Europe. 
However, as we will discuss in the concluding chapter, two major problems 
facing the V4 include coming to an agreement on how to handle relations with 
Russia, as both Hungary and Slovakia are heavily dependent on Russian energy. 
Secondly the V4 are currently struggling with how to handle the situation 
occurring in Ukraine as it is a lesser concern for the Czech Republic and seen 
more as a Polish problem. While development of the relationship between the US 
and the Visegrad countries has been affected by current uncertainty of US 
economic and military aid, it is clear that the strategy of Atlanticism, from the US 
side, is still hard at work in addressing the security concerns of the V4. These 
events have only proved the need for a continuing commitment to this part of the 
world, and ensuring the preservation of their democratic political systems and 
national sovereignty. The next chapter will begin with a brief history of the 
Visegrad Four so as to better understand how these four counties came to be 
                                            
10 Frank Dohmen, “Cold Turkey: How Germany Could End Russian Gas 
Dependency,” Spiegel Online, Spiegel Online 2014, 06 May 2014.  
11 German Lopez, “This Map Shows Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas,” 
Vox, Vox Media, 25, July 2014.  
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united under one cause, the pursuit of regional economic development and 
political security.
Brian Valdivia 10 
Chapter 1: A History of Visegrad 
Cooperation between future representatives of the V4 began long before 
the revolutions of 1989. Historical and cultural ties to each other, as well as to the 
West, have bound the histories of Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks for 
centuries. However it should be noted that years of conflict and animosity have 
also defined relationships in the region. As recently as 1968, troops from Poland 
and Hungary participated in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.  
Nonetheless, friendly ties were strengthened in the 1970’s and 80’s during a 
period of dissent and revolution within Central Europe. With an understanding of 
each country’s history before the collapse of the Soviet Union, we will discuss 
and analyze the development of the Visegrad group in the early 1990’s. Lastly by 
looking at the goals, domestic and regional policies, as well as attitudes toward 
the West displayed by the Visegrad group it will become clear the initial 
importance of the V4. 
Before the Fall: Cooperation Begins 
1 A Shared Past 
In Central Europe: Enemies Neighbors, Friends, author Lonnie R. 
Johnson shows us that the ties between the V4 countries stem as far back as the 
Middle Ages. Specifically Johnson shows us that what originally bound these 
peoples together was their indoctrination into Roman Catholicism which was 
brought by Western Missionaries in the early Middle Ages.12 We come to see that 
                                            
12 Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends, (Oxford, 
ENG: Oxford UP, 1996), 3.  
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because of Roman Catholicism, Central Europe sees itself as a longstanding 
historical representative of Western European culture. This also has to due with 
the fact that Central Europe would become the frontier of Western Culture in the 
sense that their eastern borders would be where Roman Catholic influence 
ended, and where Eastern Orthodox influence began.13 These borders, which 
were established by the Holy Roman Empire around 1500, would help cement 
Central Europe as part of the Western sphere for centuries to come. But it wasn’t 
just religion and culture that tied these peoples together.  
In both Johnson’s Central Europe and Padraic Kenney’s A Carnival of 
Revolution, the authors discuss that Central Europe, specifically the area 
encompassing postwar Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have a common 
past in east-central European dynasties as part of the Hapsburg Empire.14 The 
families that would ascend to power in the late 9th and early 10th centuries 
included the Arpad dynasty of the Kingdom of Hungary (which also included 
present day Slovakia), the Premysl Dynasty of the Bohemian Massif, and the 
Piast dynasty of the Kingdom of Poland.15  What tied these areas and families 
together were two aspects, problems and solutions. All three dynasties faced the 
problem of maintaining power and land within and outside their kingdoms. To 
combat these issues the dynasties had to engage with one another in bloody 
wars, friendly alliances and marriage pacts in order to maintain power.16 From 
                                            
13 Ibid, 4.  
14 Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 2002) 3-4.  
15 Johnson, 32.  
16 Ibid, 32.  
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these interactions with one another these dynastic states also have a shared 
history of multinational populations. From Johnson, we see that these medieval 
states “housed a variety of people,” due to the constant boarder shifts over 
centuries of interaction with one another.17 To Kenney, it is these shared histories 
in the Hapsburg Empire that originally brought the V4 together and even to this 
day still plays a major role in their cultural ties and diplomatic relationships with 
one another.18 As to the question, why did the V4 seek to “Return to Europe”, we 
can see from both Johnson and Kenney that because of Catholicism, a shared 
history of dynastic wars, alliances and marriages, as well as imperial domination 
the V4 countries are fundamentally integrated into European history and culture. 
With regard to the actual formation and buildup of the Visegrad group, we must 
turn our attention to a period in the 1970’s when dissent against communism first 
united groups of Central Europeans. 
2 Opposition to Communism 
For Polish diplomat Andrzej Ananicz, cooperation between the Visegrad 
Four against Communism can be traced back to the 1970’s with the 
dissemination of anti-regime publications and news.19 He provides examples of 
organizations that partook in such clandestine activities, including the Workers 
Defense Committee (KOR), a Polish civil society group that would later inspire 
the future Solidarity movement in Poland, as well as the Individual Publishing 
                                            
17 Ibid, 41.  
18 Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution, 3.  
19 Andrzej Ananicz, “From the Anti-Communist Underground to NATO and the 
EU,” International Visegrad Fund, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/the-visegrad-
book/ananicz-andrzej-from-the.  
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House (NOWA), the first underground publishing house in the People’s Republic 
of Poland in 1977.20 Both of these organizations featured activists who were 
committed to bringing change to Central Europe. Often, activists from Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia would visit one another during the 1970’s and 80’s 
in order to spread ideas and information that the ruling regimes would have 
deemed unfit.21 Other forms of early cooperation can be seen in examples of 
Polish printers and illegal radio transmitter specialists training colleagues in both 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.22 Such activities are especially important to note 
because some of these activists, including future Czech President Vaclav Havel23 
and future Polish Labor Minister Jacek Kuroń24, would later become the 
democratically elected authorities in the Visegrad countries once the communist 
regimes collapsed. 25 Before we discuss the beginnings of consolidation among 
                                            
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Vaclav Havel was a leading figure in the dissident movement against the 
Communist Regime of Czechoslovakia. Specifically he was the dominant leader 
during the Prague street demonstrations in 1989 and would help negotiate the 
peaceful transfer of power from the Communists to the people of Czechoslovakia 
that became known as the Velvet Revolution. Dan Bilefsky and Jane Perlez, 
“Vaclav Havel, Former Czech President, Dies at 75,” The New York Times, 18 
Dec. 2011.  
24 Known as the “godfather of a resistance,” Jacek Kuron was the senior 
organizer for the Committee to Assist Workers (KOR), which was the first 
organization to mobilize striking workers in Poland in 1976. This organization 
attracted intellectuals, students and cultural figures that would go on to provide 
support and resources to industrial workers, miners and farmers who were then 
trying to build an independent labor federation. Michael T. Kaufman, “Jacek 
Kuron, of Solidarity, Dies at 70,” The New York Times, 17 June 2004. 
25 Andrzej Ananicz, “From the Anti-Communist Underground to NATO and the 
EU”. 
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the Visegrad countries, we should first examine the revolutions that occurred in 
the late 1980’s that helped bring down Communism in Soviet bloc. 
3 The Revolutions  
After the 1970’s and into the 1980’s, communism in Central Europe began 
to weaken rapidly. Long-standing internal issues including political instability 
stemming from widespread corruption, economic scarcity, and environmental 
degradation were just some of the major systemic problems that occurred as a 
result of the actions of the communist regime.26 Perhaps one of main causes for 
the collapse of the hegemonic power in the region, the Soviet Union, was the 
eventual impact of the widespread dissent then fermenting all throughout Central 
Europe. Padraic Kenney refers to this period as the “Carnival of Revolution,” a 
period of widespread non-violent opposition that was one of the contributing 
factors to ending communism in Central Europe. Specifically, he refers to the 
“Carnival” as the three and a half year span that began with the post-Chernobyl 
demonstrations in Poland in the Spring of 1986 and ended with the Velvet 
Revolution in Czechoslovakia in November of 1989.27 However, it is important to 
note that opinion regarding the point of origin as well as the means of how the 
revolution was carried out varies. 
 In contrast to Kenney, historians Timothy Garton Ash and Gale Stokes 
view the origins and means of the revolutions somewhat differently. For Garton 
Ash the events that occurred in Central Europe in ’89, which he calls the 
                                            
26 Minton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Political Economic, and Social Challenges (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 3.  
27 Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution 3.  
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“refolutions” of ’89, begin at different times for Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. In The Magic Lantern, Garton Ash explains that what occurred 
in Central Europe in 1989 was not a revolution in traditional terms but more of a 
“mixture of reform and revolution,” hence the name “refolution.”28  One of his 
most famous quotes illustrates just how different these revolutions really were: 
“In Poland, it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: 
Perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!”29 Throughout The Magic 
Lantern, the author argues that a combination of popular pressure from below, 
i.e. opposition movements, as well as “a strong and essential element of change 
from above led by an enlightened minority in the still ruling communist parties,” 
resulted in roundtable discussions that would lead to the end of communist rule.30 
In Poland we see that Solidarity, a Polish trade Union founded in 1980, was not 
only a leading force in the roundtable discussions with the Communist Party but 
also a catalyst in the opposition movement within Poland. While the Communist 
regime heavily suppressed Solidarity before 1989, historian Gale Stokes views 
the early years of Solidarity as imperative to the Polish revolution because the 
Union “educated a generation of activists and gave almost an entire nation a 
taste of running its own affairs.”31 By early 1989 Solidarity was able to set up a 
                                            
28 Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York, NY: Random House, 1990), 
14. 
29 Ibid, 78. 
30 Ibid, 14.  
31 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism 
in Eastern Europe (Oxford, ENG: Oxford UP1993), 47. 
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roundtable discussion with the Communist Government and negotiate for a semi-
free election in June the same year, the first of it’s kind in decades.   
 From both Garton Ash and Stokes we also see similar events occurring in 
Hungary and Czecholslovakia but just with different opposition movements. In 
Hungary, we see that in May of ’88 the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party was 
able to vote in Karoly Grosz as General Secretary. Grosz, a more open-minded 
individual when it came to free market economics was seen as a progressive 
compared to his predecessor Janos Kadar.32 Under Grosz new clubs and 
associations such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Alliance of Free 
Democrats and Alliance of Young Democrats would form and go on to spearhead 
roundtable discussions by early March of ’89 which would lead to the collapse of 
Communist rule within Hungary.33  
In Czechoslovakia the leading opposition movement, known as the Civic 
Forum, would be led by famous dissident and playwright Vaclav Havel.34 The key 
to the Forum’s success resided in its ability to not only unite students and young 
people for daily rallies in the city of Prague, but also to host daily press 
conferences and discussions that would be taped and televised.35 What is 
important to note is that unlike Poland and Hungary, whose revolutions took 
some time, Czechoslovakia was able to complete its revolution in only 24 days. 
                                            
32 Stokes, 96.  
33 Garton Ash, 56.  
34 Stokes, 154-56.  
35 Garton Ash, 85.  
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The reason behind this, claims Garton Ash, is that it was the last of the V4 
countries to partake in revolution and learned from the other’s mistakes.36 
It seemed that this revolutionary fervor spread like wildfire throughout 
Central Europe as many in the region saw the collapse of all communist regimes 
as imminent. No longer would the people of Central Europe live in a state-
managed and over-regulated society. Instead, they began to be heavily 
influenced by the Western-style individualism that had been taking root for a 
number of years.37 Eventually, revolutionaries and opposition groups 
accomplished their goal to challenge communist rule by engaging in both 
campaigns of civil disobedience and protest as well as roundtable discussions 
headed by opposition groups that capitalized on the unpopularity of the single-
party system.38 These revolts were also about moving away from the dominance 
of the Soviet Union and making a “return” to Europe and sharing in its democratic 
freedoms. Regardless of their point of origin, Kenney, Garton Ash, and Stokes 
illustrate that the revolutions were the turning point; the peoples of Central 
Europe were determined to take back their countries. 
What is important to note about these revolutions is that they brought 
vastly different groups together under one goal, the end of communism. Be they 
radical environmentalists, hippies, artists, intellectuals, party members, or 
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pacifists,39 people from all walks of life were for once largely in agreement. This 
is what made these revolutions so different from previous challenges to 
communism, such as the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 
1968; a wide variety of groups joined in voicing their dissent. In contrast, the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution was only able to attract the interest of intellectuals, 
students, and workers but was unable to attract party members, farmers, etc.40 
Yet by the late 1980’s, citizens all across Central Europe from every social group 
were ready for a new way of life. That being said, it is also important to note that 
with all of these different types of social movements and personalities, varying 
types of ideologies also emerged, including anarchism, nationalism, liberalism, 
and conservatism.41 Yet in the midst of debate around how best to go about 
forming new governments in which all of these groups would have a voice, this 
much was clear, the postwar era of Soviet domination was over, Communism 
was breathing its dying breath. 
 By 1989, Communism in Central Europe had run its course, as citizens 
could not suffer under the systematic failures of the party-state any longer.42 
People were tired of living with the fear, confusion, and economic constraints that 
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limited a person’s freedom and liberty. At the same time Central Europeans were 
also attracted by the security that Europe and the West could offer in case of the 
reassertion of Russian power. Yet the securitization of these states would only be 
achieved only once they became united under a common set of goals. 
 
After the Fall: Building Up Visegrad 
 Goals 1
After the revolutions of 1989, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 
began to strengthen mutual cooperation and friendship among themselves as 
newly sovereign states. As early as the summer of 1989 we see cooperation 
among the V4 as political opposition groups such as Hungarian Democratic 
Forum and Solidarity Union in Poland began working together in order to 
strengthen relations among the different countries.43 In early 1990, the leaders of 
these countries held their first multilateral summit in the town of Visegrad, 
Hungary to discuss their future plans.44 The leaders of the Visegrad countries at 
the time, including Lech Wałęsa of Poland, Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia and 
Mátyás Szürös of Hungary, met in order to discuss how they could all begin 
creating new foundations and relationships in order to become stronger 
politically, economically, and culturally.45 Their approach to the transition 
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revolved around decentralizing power both politically and economically. Their 
primary objective was to “eliminate the remnants of the communist bloc in 
Central Europe, overcome historic animosities between Central European 
countries, successfully accomplish social transformation and join in the European 
integration process.”46 Political and social goals included the construction of a 
parliamentary democracy in each country, creating modern states under the rule 
of law that respected human rights and freedoms, and preparing to integrate into 
the European political and security realms.47 This also meant guarantees of 
freedom of press, assembly, and freedom to practice religion without the threat of 
persecution.48 
With regard to economic reform, the Visegrad group’s first order of 
business was to transition from Communist command economies to free-market 
economies based on the principles of capitalism.49 Author and historian Minton 
Goldman claims that the biggest obstacle facing the Visegrad countries was 
recovering from a system that had greatly hindered economic growth and 
development.50 Some of the basic goals of the transition included privatizing 
large and state enterprises, ending monopolies (both state and private), and for 
the first time, accepting unemployment and bankruptcies as part of the free-
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market system.51 During the communist era, it was mandatory for most people to 
have a job, so insecurity of employment in a capitalist environment was a 
significant adjustment for many people. Other economic changes included 
terminating centralized control of planning and pricing, instead allowing prices to 
be determined mainly by the markets as well as moving from an industrial to a 
post-industrial economy as a consequence of global economic change.52 The 
final goals of the newly independent Visegrad countries included dismantling 
bureaucratic planning pyramids, abandoning subsidies to producers and 
consumers, using fiscal policy to restrict demand, and making currency 
convertible, lofty goals indeed. While some countries in the Visegrad Group 
where able to adopt these changes in a smooth and expedient manner, other 
countries had trouble making the transition, as will be discussed later on in 
Chapter 2, specifically when comparing Poland and Slovakia. Problems with 
privatization, deterioration of the health care system, and environmental issues 
all arose throughout Central Europe during the transition period. Some countries 
were just better prepared than others to deal with such issues. 
In the initial talks among the Visegrad countries, while there was a heavy 
focus on establishing democracy and bolstering their economies, one of the most 
important goals became integrating with not just the European community, but 
also global institutions.53 When officially assembled in February of 1991, the 
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Visegrad group knew that by working together, they stood a better chance of 
arguing their cases for being accepted into the European and wider international 
communities. However, before beginning that discussion, it’s important explore 
the new policies, both domestic and foreign, that the Visegrad countries 
undertook. 
 2   Domestic and Regional Policies 
As stated previously, some of the immediate domestic and economic 
policies adopted included supporting the free movement of labor and capital 
based on the principles of free-market capitalism. Central to this goal was a 
heavy emphasis on creating favorable conditions for “direct cooperation of 
enterprises and foreign capital investments aimed at improving economic 
effectiveness.”54 Another important policy pursued by the Visegrad group 
included the modernization of the communications infrastructure, not only among 
the three members, but also with the rest of Europe through development of and 
improvements to power systems and telecommunication networks.55 This created 
an environment that both provided for and fostered the free flow of information, 
press, and cultural values.56 
3   Enter CEFTA  
To accomplish the above-mentioned goals, The Visegrad group met in 
February of 1991 to form the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 
in order to build trade relations between the non-EU countries in Central Europe. 
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The purpose behind this agreement was to implement their goals by mobilizing 
“joint efforts for the integration of participating countries in Western European 
institutions and, through this, to join European political, economic, security and 
legal systems and look for opportunities for close economic and political 
cooperation.”57 This agreement also included the consolidation of democracy, the 
establishment of a free market economy, the establishment of fair conditions of 
competition for trade among the CEFTA members, and the continuation of 
building harmonious relations with one another.58 Specifically the main objective 
of CEFTA was and remains the “establishment of a free trade area by gradual 
liberalization of mutual trade relations and by the removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade during a transitional period.”59 By December 21, 1992, the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement was signed by all three Visegrad 
Countries and went into effect on March 1, 1993.60 After it was implemented 
CEFTA became for a time “the most important multilateral agreement on free 
trade in the region of the Central and Southeastern Europe.”61 Since 1994, the 
Prime Ministers of the CEFTA countries have met yearly at summit meetings in 
order to discuss that year’s progress as well as future goals. By doing this, 
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CEFTA was able to help solidify the relationship among the V4 countries, which 
made it possible for them strengthen their economic and political systems.  
Today the V4 countries are no longer apart of CEFTA as their 
membership ended when they joined the EU in 2004. Current members of 
CEFTA include Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo.62  What is important to understand about this 
organization is that, even to this day, CEFTA can be seen as a means for 
European countries which are not in the EU to prepare themselves for 
association agreements and potential accession. Currently there are eight former 
members of CEFTA in the EU: the V4 countries, along with Slovenia, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia. Chapter 2 will take a look at how the V4 countries used 
CEFTA to implement their new policies.  
With a new foreign policy rooted in promoting capitalism and democracy 
among the members of the Visegrad group, the original three countries looked 
west for additional outside support in the fields of economic integration and 
national security. With such a strong united front and such admirable goals, one 
would think that the Visegrad group would find support from neighboring west 
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4 Looking to the West (Developing a Foreign Policy) 
Western Europe 
After years of isolation, the Visegrad countries began looking to Western 
Europe and the United States for closer political, economic, and military ties. One 
of the main security concerns for Central and Eastern Europe at the time was a 
revitalized and potentially hostile Soviet Union.63 Because of this fear, the 
Visegrad countries first looked to Western Europe in hopes of finding economic 
and financial assistance. The Visegrad countries had hoped to receive aid similar 
to that of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe after WWII to help rebuild their 
economies.64 Leaders within the Visegrad Group argued that in abandoning 
communist rule, they had done what both Western Europe and the US had 
wanted, and therefore they believed it was the West’s job to help them establish 
and support sovereign post-communist states. They were not alone in this belief. 
In fact, one of the greatest supporters these countries of Central Europe had 
throughout the 1990’s was neighboring Germany, which firmly believed that 
Western Europe should strengthen its ties with these post-communist 
countries.65 Considering Germany’s own history with communism in its eastern 
half, as well as its long tradition of bridging the East with the West, it is certainly 
not surprising that it had a vested interest in the future of the Visegrad Group.  
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France, on the other hand, saw the situation very differently and was 
vehemently against bringing in the East-Central European states. Leaders in 
France at the time, including President François Mitterrand, thought that it would 
be “decades and decades” before the former communist states of Central Europe 
would be ready to join the European community.66 One of France’s initial 
concerns with allowing new members into both the European Community and 
later the EU, was that it did not want to strengthen Germany’s power and 
influence. Because of close historical and cultural ties, in addition to the shared 
experience of communism in East Germany (GDR), Germany was in a position 
to influence the Visegrad countries in a way that could have greatly benefitted it. 
In response, France made it a priority to stop the integration of the Visegrad 
group into European community institutions. For instance, in September of 1991, 
France blocked a European Community plan to allow Central and Eastern 
European exports into Western Europe.67 France wanted to ensure that Western 
European markets would not become flooded with cheaper agricultural products 
which would compete against those produced by French farmers. France also 
opposed a package of trade concessions to the Visegrad countries because of it 
feared the negative impact it would have on French agriculture.68 However, 
despite these obstacles posed by France, Western Europe did not completely 
turn its back on the Visegrad group. 
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The EU (Initially) 
In early 1993, the new post-Maastricht EU resisted extending an invitation 
to the Visegrad countries due to several major issues. First, the EU was deeply 
concerned about the prospect of mass migrations, as affording membership to 
the Central European states would provide its many new citizens with the 
opportunity to resettle in Western Europe.69 Additionally, just as France had, 
other EU states also worried that their own economic interests would suffer from 
increased competition in the industrial sector. Industries such as textiles, coal, 
and steel would have been greatly affected had the Visegrad countries been 
permitted to join immediately.70 Finally, it is important to note that when new 
member states are accepted into the EU, all of the institutions within the Union 
need to be restructured due to the influx of citizens. A few examples of EU 
restructuring include adapting to the free movement of new EU citizens, providing 
benefits and jobs for the new youth population, restructuring EU political 
institutions including the Parliament and Council, and promoting social inclusion 
and protection for new cultures entering the EU.71 That being said, the EU was 
willing to make some important concessions. 
After initially declining to extend membership to the Visegrad countries, 
the EU did allow Central and Eastern European agricultural and other exports 
into Western markets. By June of 1993, EU leaders finally extended a formal 
invitation of membership to Poland, Hungary, and the newly separated states of 
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the Czech Republic and Slovakia.72 However, in order for these countries to join, 
they were required to meet the three standards of the Copenhagen Criteria, 
which was easier said than done. In order to meet the three criteria countries 
were required to have: 
“Politically stable institutions guaranteeing Democracy, rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economically, countries 
must have a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
EU competition and market forces. In addition, countries must have the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the political, economic and monetary aims of the Union.”73  
 
In order to meet these criteria, the Visegrad countries would need economic and 
political aid. With this in mind, the Visegrad group turned its attention even further 
west toward North America. 
The US 
Since the 1970’s, the future political leaders of the Visegrad group had 
been deeply inspired by American individualism, activism, and idealism. 
Likewise, the US had taken note of the V4’s progress in becoming modern 
democratic states. This shared interest would lead to the fostering of a 
relationship that was based on Atlanticism; the belief that cooperation between 
North America and Europe is necessary.74 After 1989, the US became strongly 
favored in Central Europe. As discussed later on in Chapter 3, many citizens 
appreciated the role the US had played in helping to end Communist rule. 
Specifically, US policies were a constant outside agitator against the Communist 
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regimes “by bringing attention to human rights violations, by restricting trade in 
strategic and related goods, and by expanding détente with the Soviet Union to 
improve the international environment.”75 This, in combination with Central 
Europe’s desire for security, democracy, and economic prosperity led to the 
beginning stages of Atlanticism in Central Europe. When Central Europe, 
specifically the Visegrad group, began to come into its own, the US started to 
champion the integration of its states into the Atlantic world.76 The US 
understood that integration equaled “the natural step next in the consolidation of 
freedom and peace on the continent.”77 However, even though the US may have 
been ready for Central Europe to become a part of the Atlantic world, as 
discussed earlier, Western Europe was not as easily convinced. By the mid 90’s, 
the Visegrad group and the US decided that instead of trying to get Poland, 
Hungary, and the newly separated Czech Republic and Slovakia into the EU, it 
would be more beneficial to enhance Central Europe’s security by other means. 
This discussion will continue on later in Chapter 3 and will show how the US was 
able to bring the Visegrad countries into the Atlantic world by campaigning for 
their acceptance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
 
Conclusion 
With the understanding that the ties between Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia stem back centuries it becomes clear that cooperation 
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between the leaders of the Visegrad member states did not simply begin after the 
fall of communism in 1989, but reached back long before to the period of 
opposition movements in the 1970’s. These relationships between the social 
movements helped lead to the revolutions that would take Central and Eastern 
Europe by storm in the late 1980’s, and eventually contribute to the fall of 
Communism. Initially, the Visegrad states set out with one goal in mind, to rid 
society of the ills and restrictions of communism. With a recovery plan rooted in 
democracy and free markets, the Visegrad countries strove to be much like their 
Western neighbors. However, as shown later on in Chapter 2, some of the V4 
countries prospered better than others. Slovakia in particular had a difficult 
transition process related to various political and economic issues. That being 
said, it will be important to look at the success that Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic were able to achieve through their more aggressive reforms. For 
instance, by 1996, over 50% of Poland’s gross national product came from the 
private sector of the economy.78 This is not to say that there were no problems in 
these countries during the transition period. As will be shown, it is no easy task to 
shift from one kind of economic model, the Communist command economy, to a 
completely different one defined by the free market. This transition was rife with 
problems, including unemployment, rapid inflation, and increased cost of living, 
frightening prospects for peoples accustomed to the tight control and 
predictability Communism once offered. 
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After analyzing these countries’ transition process, we will finally be able 
to move into the main subject of this thesis, the relationship between the 
Visegrad group and the United States after the fall of communism. Chapter 3 will 
examine the attitudes, goals, and policies pursued by the US, and hopefully shed 
more light on why, even to this day, the United States maintains a “rock solid” 
commitment to this area of the world. Finally the results of these policies, 
including the Visegrad group’s acceptance into both NATO and the EU and what 
that meant at the time will be discussed. Once again, the aim of this research is 
to not only understand the history of this relationship, but to also ascertain why 
the US’s commitment to both Central and Eastern Europe remains so vital. 
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Chapter 2: The Transition Process 
 Before they could enter NATO, the EU, and the Atlantic world, the 
countries of the Visegrad group had to first establish themselves as politically 
democratic states with economically viable free markets. The primary goal was to 
demonstrate to the Atlantic world that not only were these countries embracing 
change, but that they were also committed to dismantling the systems and 
practices that characterized communism. Once they were able to show 
significant progress in this direction, the US and the rest of the Atlantic world 
would be more inclined to offer both political and economic support. However, 
this was easier said than done. 
All three (and later four) countries had difficulties with the transition from 
communist structures to a new system that focused on the decentralization of 
power. It is important to note that all of the Visegrad countries had different 
approaches when it came to ridding their country of the remnants of communism. 
With regards to economic change, the V4 countries would have to change over 
from a command-style economy that was greatly centralized to an economy 
based on free market principles. New reforms that the future V4 countries would 
have to address included how to handle private property, private capital and 
capital markets as well as creating a new entrepreneurial class and laws that 
would govern investment, banking, property taxes and businesses.79 On top of 
this, new institutions would have to be created in order to deal with all of these 
issues. This would prove to be difficult for some more than others. However, the 
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biggest problem facing the newly independent countries was privatization or 
“transferring the ownership and control of assets from the state to the private 
sector and diversifying ownership.”80  As will be shown, each country handled 
their economic transition period very differently. In Poland, for example, the 
country used a method known as “shock therapy”, meaning that economic 
reforms were instituted immediately and simultaneously. Both Poland and 
Hungary were able to successfully, and rather quickly, transform its economies 
and government to mimic those in Western Europe and the US. However, 
Czechoslovakia had a much harder time transitioning. For the most part, this was 
because at the time, Czechoslovakia was preparing its “velvet divorce”, leading 
to the establishment of two new Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Slovakia in particular had the hardest time during the transition process 
because of the authoritarian rule of then Prime Minister, Vladimír Mečiar. Mečiar, 
unlike the other Visegrad leaders, didn’t think that economic reforms should be 
instituted at a rapid pace in the “Big Bang” approach proposed by Czech 
politician and finance minister Vaclav Klaus. Rather, Slovakia wanted to proceed 
at a much slower pace, hoping to help curb problems such as unemployment and 
inflation. 
Throughout this chapter similar themes occurred in each country, 
including the difficulties of economic change, the rise of nationalism, the rise of 
competing political parties, and issues such as unemployment and inflation. To 
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simplify things, I will break up each case study into two parts: political transition 
and economic development/struggles.  
Poland 
 Political Transition 1
Historian and analyst Minton F. Goldman explains that after the fall of the 
communist regime, the Poles transformed their government from one that was 
dominated by the Communist Party to a parliamentary democracy. In the June 
1989 Parliamentary elections, the first real, if only partially free elections held 
within the communist world in many decades, the movement known as Solidarity 
would go on to win 90% of the freely contested Senate seats.  Although the 
majority of seats in the lower house, the Sejm, had been reserved for the 
communists and their allies, Solidarity’s clear victory gave it the upper hand in 
negotiating with the communists.81 One month later, Presidential elections were 
held during which the last leader of the Communist People’s Republic of Poland, 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, was elected by only by a small majority of the Sejm. Once in 
office, Jaruzelski had to be cautious about using his power because of 
Solidarity’s undisputed electoral victory.82 With this in mind, Jaruzelski asked 
Solidarity to nominate a candidate for the position of Prime Minister. A high-
ranking Solidarity political activist by the name of Tadeusz Mazowiecki was 
selected to become Poland’s first non-communist Prime Minister.83 
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By December of 1989, the Polish parliament had abolished Article 3 of the 
country’s constitution, which reserved for the communists the “leading role” in the 
state, thereby officially ending their authoritarian rule over Poland.84 To celebrate 
this occasion, the parliament also voted to change the country’s name from 
“Polish People’s Republic” to the “Polish Republic.” Other amendments to the 
Constitution included a provision in support of liberal and pluralist political 
systems, as well as the freedom to create new political parties.85 These changes 
helped initiate the process to decentralize both the government and economy. 
Central to the democratization of the Polish political system was 
restoration of freely contested local elections. Political scientist Emil J. Kirchner 
explains that in early 1990, the new Polish Government had scheduled local 
referendums in order to determine how communities would govern themselves.86 
Essentially, the Poles viewed this new initiative of self-governance as the first 
steps toward democratization, as the people’s opinion and input would finally 
have a place to be heard, and one of the most important tasks of these new local 
governments was to set up a tax system that would help fund their communities. 
This tax system would include property taxes, taxes on transportation means, 
farmland and forests, and even a stamp duty.87 These taxes would go toward 
local government funding of community services, including fire departments and 
hospitals. With such success at the local level, one would think that the efforts at 
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transition at the national level would be a success from the start. However, this 
would not be the case. 
Political Problems 
One of the first major problems faced by the Polish people during the 
transition was the factionalism within the Solidarity movement. It is imperative to 
understand that what brought the Solidarity movement together was opposition to 
communism.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, what made the Solidarity movement so 
successful was that people from all different walks of life came together under 
one cause. However, once communism ended in Poland, Solidarity no longer 
had a goal that could unite its constituent parts.88 Instead, what occurred was the 
emergence of competing political parties. The two most influential parties that 
came out of Solidarity were the Citizens Movement for Democratic Action 
(ROAD), and the Center Alliance. Heading ROAD was Prime Minister 
Mazowiecki, who thought that Solidarity should transform itself into a political 
party with defined goals and policies.89 In response to this move, co-founder of 
the Solidarity movement Lech Wałęsa formed the Center Alliance, which thought 
that Solidarity should remain an amorphous organization that didn’t ostracize 
anyone. Wałęsa wanted to create a political system that represented all instead 
of just the majority party.90 However, the major difference between the two 
parties and their leaders was their stance on how the economic reforms should 
be implemented. 
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Defending a rapid transition process that would bring a free-market 
economy to Poland was Wałęsa and the Center Alliance. Wałęsa was convinced 
that if Poland was going to make changes, that two things needed to be done. 
First, an immediate overhaul of the communist command economy needed to be 
executed in order for Poland to transform into a free-market system. Secondly, 
Wałęsa wanted to rid the political system of any former Communist politicians 
that were still in power.91 This was directly aimed at President Jaruzelski, who 
because of rising pressure resigned his position in September of 1990. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum were Prime Minister Mazowiecki and 
ROAD, who supported a more gradual approach to economic reform. The reason 
for this was that Mazowiecki and his supporters were nervous about the effects 
that such a transition could have on the people of Poland. Bear in mind that the 
Polish people, for the most part, had not experienced participatory democracy in 
decades, meaning that it might take some time to adjust to the new political 
reality. Additionally, it is worth noting that this generation of Poles had grown-up 
under the influence of Communism, and a cradle-to-grave social security net that 
guaranteed work, food, and shelter. This is important to mention because now 
people could no longer expect the government to aid them in times of need. By 
November 1990, it was evident that only one of these parties would emerge the 
victor in the Presidential Election, the first to be decided by popular vote, and on 
December 9 1990, the people’s decision was clear. Lech Wałęsa would become 
Poland’s next president; the country had sided with Wałęsa on how they wanted 
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the transition process to occur.92 The next section will discuss Wałęsa’s 
presidency from 1991-1995 as most of his administration’s focus was centered 
on the economy, but for now, but it is imperative to first look at some of the 
political accomplishments that occurred in the early 90’s.  
One of the most significant political developments for Poland came in 
1992 when politicians from all parties agreed that it was time for a new 
constitution. The former Constitution was viewed as outdated and obstructive to 
the new political and economic changes that Wałęsa was trying to accomplish.93 
With this in mind, on November 17, 1992, the Polish Parliament established what 
was called the “Little Constitution”. In a nutshell, the “Little Constitution” 
abolished the old 1952 Constitution, made the president responsible for 
implementing foreign policy and commander-in-chief of the army, and 
strengthened parliamentary control over the choice and behavior of the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet, thereby making it harder for a dictatorship to emerge.94 
By 1997, following a popular referendum organized under a new government,  an 
official constitution was adopted that strengthened Poland’s reputation as a 
parliamentary democracy. Today, this Constitution is the cornerstone of Polish 
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 Economic Developments/Struggles 2
The roots of Polish economic change began in 1989 when the newly 
elected government decided to approve a rapid economic reform plan known as 
the “Balcerowicz plan.”95 A two-stage strategy was set up that included taking 
measures to stabilize their currency and stop inflation and rapidly privatizing 
state-held enterprises.96 The first strategy involved opening Poland up to the 
world economy and making its currency convertible, freeing most government 
regulated prices, and easing small entrepreneurs into business.97 The second 
strategy of privatizing industry would prove to be more difficult. At the time, the 
finance minister of Poland, Leszek Balcerowicz suggested that the Polish 
economy needed “shock therapy” treatment; rapid and radical change. This 
would essentially be Poland’s first steps toward the free market system; however, 
this is not to say that there were no problems. 
One of the first effects of the “shock therapy” transition period was the rise 
of prices in commodities including electricity, gas, and coal; electricity and gas 
rose 400% in price, while the price of coal soared over 600%.98 Other issues 
included unemployment, which reached 25% by January 1990, and declining 
wages led to strikes in both the railroad and agriculture industries.99 Add to this 
the problem of Poland having an ineffective banking system, which increased the 
risk for disaster for the new reforms.  
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One of the most apparent flaws of privatization was that people lacked the 
capital and loans required to buy state-owned industries.100 People simply did not 
have the money to help transform the economy from command to free market as 
intended. This was especially troubling as Poland was trying to improve its 
international image in order to attract new foreign investors. Other issues that 
concerned investors was the excess of employees at certain industries, the 
inefficient products sometimes made, and the enormous environmental deficits 
that state-run industries accrued.101 To combat this negative publicity, the Polish 
government established a Western-style stock market in April of 1991.102 It 
hoped that this would help promote the message that Poland had a capital 
market and was open for business. To go along with this, the government also 
set up a modern, privately-owned bank known as Kredyt Bank. Kredyt Bank was 
founded by a consortium of private and state-owned Polish companies with the 
goal of being seen as on the cutting edge of electronic banking.103 With these 
improvements to their financial infrastructure in place, Poland was ready to move 
forward with true economic reform. 
Throughout the early 90’s, the effects of economic reform were seen and 
felt all over Poland. These efforts were largely spearheaded by then Prime 
Minister, Hanna Suchocka. Under Suchocka, Poland made great leaps toward 
becoming a free-market economy. Some of these achievements included 
establishing the Polish currency as internationally convertible and raising the 
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wages of Polish citizens.104 During Suchocka’s time as Prime Minister, Poland 
also saw substantial growth in the private sector during which, by 1993, 50% of 
Poland’s workforce was employed by private enterprises.105 Once the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) saw these changes, it agreed to allow Poland 
to borrow $700 million in order to continue its economic reforms.106 However, as 
Suchocka would learn, there were costs for the improvements that were made to 
the economy. 
One of the biggest fallouts of Suchocka’s achievements is that the public 
blamed her policies for the rise in inflation and unemployment. Because of this, in 
September of 1993, the Polish parliament voted the coalition led by Prime 
Minister Suchocka, a major supporter of Wałęsa and rapid economic reform, out 
of office. 107 Taking her place was Waldemar Pawlak, a staunch adversary of 
“shock therapy” who wanted to slow down the economic transition process in 
order to ease some of the difficulties the Polish people were facing. Historian 
Padraic Kenney calls this change in the process and speed of economic 
transition “democratic alternation.”108 Essentially what would occur in both Poland 
and Hungary was not so much a crackdown or abandonment of economic 
reform, but rather it would be either slowed down or sped up depending on how 
the market and society were reacting. With regards to Pawlak’s policies, the 
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economic transition process in combination with a rough relationship with 
Wałęsa, meant that the year 1994 saw little privatization occur in Poland. 
By 1995, the people of Poland had tired of Wałęsa and his policies and 
elected Aleksander Kwasniewski as the President. Kwasniewski, a member of 
the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance, was able to capitalize on his 
popularity with young people as they saw him as the future of Poland.109 
However, what made Kwasniewski stand out most was his moderate and 
restrained attitude on the privatization of the Polish economy. Kwasniewski knew 
that privatization still needed to happen if Poland was ever going to be accepted 
into the Atlantic world, but he was also aware of the toll it had taken on the Polish 
people. With this in mind, Kwasniewski pursued a more gradual approach to 
implementing privatization. One of his first acts as president was to offer Polish 
citizens ownership of hundreds of former state companies for a mere $8 a 
share.110 This was a smart move on the president’s part, because while people 
had wanted to buy companies from the state, they didn’t have enough capital to 
afford them. At the same time, the President worked on improving the image of 
Poland to international investors in order to bring more money into the country.111 
By the end of 1995, Poland’s economy was in much better condition than 
it had been in the previous years. The economic growth rate was at 4.5% in 
1995, making Poland a leader in economic transition within the Visegrad group, 
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and unemployment had leveled off.112 Finally, Western banks agreed to 
restructure Polish debt from $14 billion to $7.5 billion, making it much easier for 
Poland to repay its debt.113 This move would also encourage future foreign 
investment, which also assisted the transition process, even if it came with 
nationalist alarms of an “invasion” of foreign and especially German capital.  
Hungary 
Just like Poland, Hungary also faced problems, including stabilization of its 
currency, freeing prices from government control, setting up commercial banking, 
and trying to fight unemployment as the country began to privatize its 
industries.114 However, unlike its regional neighbor Poland, which opted for a fast 
paced approach when it came to economic reform, Hungarian politicians took a 
somewhat different path.  
After first exploring Hungary’s transition from an authoritarian Communist 
government to a Parliamentary Democracy, the focus will then turn to how the 
moderate approach to economic reform taken by the new government both 
hindered and helped Hungary during its period of transition. It will also be 
important to examine how the collapse of the communist regime helped give birth 
to a major nationalist movement within Hungary that is still very much alive today. 
By analyzing this movement, a better understanding will be gained on why 
Hungary today is once again moving more towards more authoritarian rule under 
the government led by Viktor Orbán and the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance. 
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Finally an examination will be conducted of some of the economic problems that 
occurred during the transition process, including unemployment and inflation, 
increasing poverty, a rise in foreign debt, and the overall sluggish pace of reform.  
1 Political Transition 
In 1989, the Hungarian Communist Party began to democratize the 
country’s political system in order to strengthen public support for the Party. 
However, because Hungarian citizens had wanted democratic freedom for years 
by this point, they weren’t going to settle for such a small taste. Rather, what 
ended up occurring was the demise of the communist party within Hungary. By 
October of 1989, reformers within the communist party saw the end coming and 
realized that it was finally time to give up the party’s monopoly on power and 
move toward a more Western democratic system.115 Out of this decision came 
the replacement of the Communist Party with the new Hungarian Socialist Party. 
However, the Socialist party, made up largely of former communists, quickly 
learned that even with a new moderate approach to politics and a reformist 
attitude, Hungarians were still wary of trusting those who were part of the old 
system. With that, the Hungarian Socialist Part was swept out of power in 
parliamentary elections in March of 1990. 
The two major parties to emerge from the ’90 parliamentary elections were 
the Democratic Forum Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) who 
both promised to reform not only the government but also the economy. The 
Democratic Forum party would go on to win a plurality of seats within Parliament, 
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making it the leading force during the early transition period.116 Leading the 
Democratic Forum was Jozef Antall, who would become the first Prime Minister 
of the newly democratized Hungary. Antall and his government promised that the 
economic reforms would not take the form of “shock therapy” as was occurring in 
Poland, but rather would be implemented slowly and gradually so as to not put 
pressure on the Hungarian people.117 Antall also expressed his desire to 
decentralize the political system in order to bring power back to the people. 
Therefore, on January 1, 1990, the Parliament passed the Local Government 
Act, which would transform the centralized political system under the communists 
into a “normative decentralized revenue-driven system.”118 The Act called upon 
“every settlement, even the smallest, to set up a municipal government to 
manage its own affairs.119 This would mean that towns, cities, and districts would 
now all have representative governments giving people more political freedom 
and choice. However, this is not to say that there were not any problems for 
Hungary on the road to democratization. 
Some of the initial problems that occurred in the political development of 
Hungary included oligarchical decision-making by the two ruling parties, the 
Democratic Forum and the SZDSZ. Within their first few months in power, 
leaders of both the Forum and SZDSZ secretly met to decide on issues of policy 
without consulting their colleagues with an agenda that included selecting the 
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cabinet as well as the President, Arpad Goncz.120 The problem with this top-
down approach is that it hampered the development of true participatory 
democracy and once again, placed power into the hands of the few. The reason 
behind this secrecy was that the ruling parties sought to circumvent Hungary’s 
labor unions, which in turn led them to implement the Labor Codes in July of 
1992.121 In a nutshell, the Labor Codes were a way to weaken and decentralize 
unions by putting workers under the control of employers. From this example it 
becomes clear that today’s proclivity towards authoritarian rule in Hungary has its 
roots in the political transition of the early 1990’s. 
Another major issue facing Hungary was voter apathy towards elections 
and politics in general. For instance, in the 1990 presidential election, only 66% 
of the population casted ballots, as many did not feel connected with the parties’ 
candidates.122 This was not just a national political problem, but a local one as 
well. At the time, Hungarians did not take the local elections seriously because 
most of them had never really participated in truly free elections. Given this 
unfamiliarity with the new system, in combination with the fact that on the local 
level, there were over 60 parties running for election in 1990, and one can see 
why people felt disconnected to politics.123 Lack of voter participation meant that 
only the loudest voices were heard, and for Hungary, this meant the emergence 
of a nationalist Right which would eventually come to dominate Hungarian 
politics. Initially, nationalist rhetoric was voiced mainly by members of the new 
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political elite, while the average citizen tended to support the Socialists. The 
Socialist party consisted mainly of former communists who were looking for a 
way back into politics. They preached that Hungary’s future rested in giving the 
market economy a “human face” that wouldn’t strip away the social safety net 
that many Hungarians had become dependent on over the years.124 By 1994, the 
people of Hungary had tired of the economic reforms, though moderate in 
comparison to Poland, which had nonetheless led to a rise in unemployment and 
inflation. Because of this, the Socialists would go on to win a clear majority over 
both the Democratic Forum and SZDSZ parties in the May ’94 Parliamentary 
elections.125 Because of support from the unemployed and elderly, in 
combination with the fact that people longed for the stability associated with 
communist rule, the Socialists were able to sweep the elections and regain 
power. They remained in power until 1998, when an old rival made a surprising 
comeback. 
FIDESZ- From Liberal to Conservative 
During the ’90 and ‘94 Parliamentary elections, a new political party of 
young liberals entered the political arena. FIDESZ, or the Alliance of Young 
Democrats, was composed of young moderate liberals who supported programs 
of modernization and opposed radical nationalism.126 Its leader, Victor Orbán, 
was an avid supporter of rapid privatization and fundamental economic reforms. 
In the 1990 Parliamentary elections, FIDESZ went onto to receive 8.95% of the 
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vote.127 However, because of the growth in popularity of the Socialists, who 
advocated a slower transition process, FIDESZ only won 7.02% of the vote in the 
Parliamentary elections of 1994.128 Because of this electoral setback, FIDESZ 
and Orbán changed their political stance from liberalism to conservatism and, 
eventually, nationalism. They also changed the party’s name from FIDESZ-
Alliance of Young Democrats to FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party in 1995.129 With 
this change in ideology came a flood of new members and citizens who identified 
with the party. This is important to note because by 1998, FIDESZ won 
parliamentary elections and headed a coalition government.  After losing 
elections to the Socialists in 2002, FIDESZ returned to power in 2006 and won 
super-majorities in the 2010 and 2014 elections. Chapter 4 will come back to the 
topic of FIDESZ and Orbán to discuss developments in Hungary after the country 
joined the EU in 2004. 
2 Economic Developments/Struggles 
Because Hungary decided to take a more gradual approach toward 
economic reforms than Poland had, the country experienced different problems 
while moving toward a free market. The main issues Hungary faced in 1990 
included recession, high poverty levels, a high annual inflation rate of 23%, and 
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the highest per-capita debt in Central and Eastern Europe.130 However, it is 
important to note that Hungary’s economic reforms also had an upside. Hungary 
was one of the first countries of the former Communist Bloc to begin making 
economic reforms, starting already in the communist era, putting it ahead of other 
countries such as Czechoslovakia. Hungary was also in the fortunate position of 
being a member to both the IMF and World Bank, which the country had joined in 
1982.131 Also in early 1990 when Jozef Antall’s government had taken over, 
private owned small businesses  (under 500 employees) were immediately 
allowed to operate and the state began to levy income taxes.132 Finally, Hungary 
was in a good position in terms of paying back its foreign debt, as Prime Minister 
Antall made it one of the cornerstones of his policy in order to bring more foreign 
investment to Hungary. By 1991 10% of Hungarian firms had a joint venture 
agreement with some form of foreign investment.133 However, there were other 
economic issues that stalled Hungary’s economic reforms. 
One of the greatest obstacles that Hungary faced in privatizing its 
economy was a lack of financial infrastructure. Just like Poland, Hungary lacked 
the independent banking system required to provide credit to would-be private 
entrepreneurs.134 To combat this, the Hungarian Parliament reformed the legal 
system in order to support private industries, which laid the groundwork for future 
independent banks. Once the banking system was established by the mid 90’s, 
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the government then focused on establishing a stock market.135 However, it 
would not be until the end of the 90’s that the Hungarian stock market really took 
off under the first Orbán government.  With unemployment at 8% in 1991 and 
growing, most of the early and mid 90’s was spent on getting people back to 
work in order to avoid political destabilization.136 Once again, like the rest of the 
states of the former Soviet Bloc, Hungary was a country that had for years been 
supported by a social safety net that guaranteed people work and cradle-to-grave 
social benefits. This social safety net was popular, but in a system based on free 
markets and capitalism, it became largely unsustainable in the state socialist 
forms that characterized communism.  Politicians had to tread lightly when 
making difficult, but necessary reforms to these systems. However, there was 
some progress made as a consequence of the limited economic reforms; soon, 
half of the GDP was coming from private companies, there was an increase of 
exports being sold to Western markets, and the break-up of state monopolies 
and large industrial conglomerates led to more people owning smaller-sized 
firms.137 With this understanding of Hungary’s transition period, we can finally 
turn our attention to the last Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.  
Czechoslovakia 
To understand how the countries of Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
established their present-day democracies and free market systems, it is crucial 
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to look back to 1989 when the two states still constituted federal Czechoslovakia. 
It is important to note that the process of democratization and economic reforms 
began right after the fall of communism and before what is known as the “Velvet 
Divorce”, or the split of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Because of this split, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia would have very different experiences in their 
transition process than both Poland and Hungary. Slovakia in particular had a 
much harder time during its transition period. Just as before, a break down of the 
political and economic transitions that occurred in both states will be provided so 
as to better understand why these countries separated as well as how the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia were able to enter into the Atlantic world. However, before 
diving into these topics, first an examination of the initial steps taken by 
Czechoslovakia toward political democratization and free markets will be 
discussed. 
1 Before the “Velvet Divorce” 
In June of 1989, Vaclav Havel and other leading dissidents in 
Czechoslovakia had signed the “Just a few sentences” document, which called 
for the democratization of the Czechoslovakian government.138 By November, 
Havel had created a new democratic political movement called the Civic Forum, 
and with the help of the newly elected Prime Minister, Marian Calfa, a Slovak 
reformist, they were able to remove the communists from power. One of the most 
important policies pursued by this new group of leaders was the decentralization 
of political power. Just as Poland and Hungary had done, Czechoslovakia 
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wanted to encourage political participation from the bottom up. To do this, the 
new parliament passed legislation to create self-governing institutions at the 
local, regional and provincial levels.139 The main aim behind all of this was to 
break away from the communist-style system that promoted territorial 
administration and move towards a reliance on democratically elected local 
governments. Shortly thereafter, on December 29, Czechoslovakian’s had the 
opportunity to vote for their first president, who was none other than Vaclav 
Havel, the first non-communist leader in over 40 years.140 
Some of the initial achievements of the new leadership in Czechoslovakia 
included the removal of Soviet forces from both Czech and Slovak lands, the 
expansion of private entrepreneurship, and the establishment of parliamentary 
elections for June of 1990.141 Out of 22 political parties and movements that 
participated in the June election, the two major winners were Havel’s Civic Forum 
in Czech lands and the Public against Violence (PAV) in Slovakia. Both political 
movements called for recognition and respect for human rights, the freedom to 
build a multiparty democracy, the establishment of a free-market economy and 
the creation of environmental protection laws.142 Upon gaining power, Havel and 
the Civic Forum wanted fundamental economic change but urged caution so that 
Czechoslovakia would not experience the severe pain of “shock therapy” similar 
to what had occurred in Poland. Instead, the idea was to approach the situation 
with a social democratic attitude and provide something of a safety net to the 
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public in order to minimize the hardships of the transition process.143 However, 
the biggest problem for the new Czechoslovakian government became the 
disagreements between Czech and Slovak leaders on how this plan should be 
implemented. 
One of the initial issues within the Civic Forum party were the 
disagreements between President Vaclav Havel and party chairman and Finance 
Minister Vaclav Klaus. The primary disagreement between the two revolved 
around how they should move forward with the Civic Forum movement now that 
it was in power.144 For instance, Havel had wanted to turn the Civic Forum into a 
political entity that could appeal to all, loosely based on shared beliefs and ideas. 
Klaus, on the other hand, wanted to restructure the movement into a modern 
political party based on a clearly defined agenda with a registered 
membership.145 Another major disagreement was about how to pursue the 
reform of Czechoslovakia’s economy. As mentioned, Havel had wanted to take a 
more gradual approach and retain a social safety, specifically for the wage-
earning groups and salaried employees of major cities. Klaus, in response, 
argued that minimum restrictions on reform and a fast-paced policy of 
privatization would benefit the country best. Klaus was also a major spokesman 
for farmers and the countryside of Czechoslovakia who were interested in getting 
their products out to Western Europe as soon as possible.146 Because of these 
differences, the Civic Forum split into two separate parties, the Civic Democratic 
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Party (led by Klaus) and the Civic Movement Party (led by Havel). This split 
would have two major repercussions: the weakening of Vaclav Havel’s power 
and popularity, as well as the weakening of these two parties influence overall in 
the Czechoslovak state. In this context, a new party and leader arose out of the 
Slovakian PAV movement. 
By the middle of 1991, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) 
emerged led by Vladimir Meciar. Meciar, a former communist, had become the 
face of Slovak nationalism and a champion of independent Slovakia.147 Both the 
MDS and Meciar believed that Slovakia’s interests could never fully be met by a 
government predominately run by Czechs, including Havel and Klaus. Another 
major problem for Slovaks was that the federal government was centered in 
Prague, which meant that this would be where all of the country’s political 
decisions would come from. Because of his spirited defense of Slovak interests, 
Meciar became very popular with the Slovak people, and his nationalist agenda 
acquired widespread support within Slovakia. However, before getting into the 
“divorce”, a look at some of the economic reforms that were pursued by 
Czechoslovakia in the early 90’s must be discussed. 
One of the first moves toward economic reform in Czechoslovakia 
included the closure of inefficient state-owned enterprises and the privatization of 
thousands of small state-owned retail outlets and shops.148 In addition, the new 
government also removed state control over 85% of the goods sold in the 
country, and even limited the money supply to stabilize the Czechoslovak 
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currency.149 However, even when implemented gradually, these policies still had 
painful effects on Czechoslovak society. 
Some of the initial problems faced during the early economic reforms was 
a rise in unemployment and a 23% decline in industrial production in 1991. In 
addition, prices of goods rose 25% in early ’91, and by June, they had increased 
by 45%.150 Privatization itself was also a difficult process; the two most significant 
barriers to privatization faced by Czechoslovakia at this time were the absence of 
capital citizens need to buy state-owned enterprises, and the lack of 
entrepreneurial experience within the country. To combat these problems, the 
Prague Government introduced a voucher system that allowed citizens to 
collectively buy and sell shares of different firms within the country.151 By January 
of 1992, 8.7 million Czechs and Slovaks had registered their vouchers with over 
400 investment firms. By April of 1993, after the Velvet Divorce, a stock market 
opened up in Prague, which led to an increase in domestic and foreign 
investments.152 With regard to unemployment, which had reached 6.3% at the 
end of 1991, the government adjusted currency exchange rates, approved wage 
increases, continued state control of some large enterprises and increased its 
control over rents and utility bills.153 The idea behind controlling rents and utilities 
was to support those who were not making enough at their jobs in the new 
economy.  However, despite these measures, the reforms tended to help more 
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Czechs than Slovaks, as the economy in Slovakia had a much tougher time 
privatizing its state-owned enterprises. Czechs in general had more competitive 
industries that led to more investment from abroad.154 Slovaks, on the other 
hand, were dealing with a slow transition process and an unemployment rate that 
reached 11.1% at the end of 1992.155 Because of this clear difference in how the 
two countries were affected by the economic reforms, as well as a strained 
relationship, after their electoral victories in 1992 both Klaus and Meciar agreed 
that it was finally time to end the federal state. From Martin M. Simecka, longtime 
editor-in-chief of SME Slovakia’s leading daily newspaper, readers see that at the 
time “Slovaks felt humiliated by the verbal dominance of Czech politicians, who 
spoke seemingly rationally but misused their language to suppress the budding 
Slovak longing for equal rights.”156 After December 31, 1992 Czechoslovakia 
ceased to exist, and was replaced by two separate states. This event would 
become known as the “Velvet Divorce”, due to the non-violent nature of the 
breakup. 
2 Czech Republic 
Political Transition 
With regard to the Czech Republic’s political transition, it is interesting to 
point out that out of all of the countries discussed, the Czech Republic had one of 
the most interesting transition periods as their move from a communist 
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dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy is still highly debated among scholars 
and citizens. This has to do with the fact that while some, including Minton 
Goldman sees the transition period as a success because of the political 
infrastructure that was in place in Prague. This allowed Czechs to simply 
complete the reforms they had initiated since 1989.157 Essentially, all of the 
important government buildings and facilities were in the hands of the Czechs, 
meaning that they could spend their time focusing on the economy. However, 
some, including Political scientist Martin Horak, view the transition period as 
problematic for several reasons. In his book Governing the Post-Communist City, 
Horak shows that at the beginning of their tenure the Czech Republic’s 
government, mainly made up of Prague political elites, performed poorly because 
they were “unable or unwilling to develop and implement systematic policies 
through open democratic processes in key spheres of public concern.”158 The 
two cases Horak points to are the discrepancies over public transportation and 
the preservation and development in Prague’s historic core. With regards to 
transportation, after the fall of Communist influence in the Czech Republic a large 
majority of the population wanted to scale back costly communist-era freeway 
plans within the inner city.159 However, the Prague government at the time did 
not want to reform the transport planning institutions, one of the few institutions 
that survived the fall of communism, and instead continued with the freeway 
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plans that had been in process since the mid-1980’s.160 The second example 
Horak points to, what to do with Prague’s historic core, is somewhat of a similar 
situation as the government took matters into their own hands again. At the time 
the government was looking for new sources of revenue and decided to sell 
historic sights and landmarks within Prague to real estate developers in. Though 
this decision was seen as very unpopular by civilians, government officials went 
ahead with plans in order to gain not only revenue for the state but also personal 
financial gain for themselves161. In both cases the Prague government refused to 
engage in political discussion and debate with the public, specifically civic activist 
groups, in order to push through their own agenda. The government at the time 
didn’t see these two issues as pressing matters and mainly focused their 
attention on the political and economic transition of the country. However, 
because of these actions the Czech government is still seen by many today as 
ineffective and un-democratic in certain aspects.162  
Other problems facing the new Czech government actually had to deal 
with the US and the sale of weapons to unstable nations. In the early 90’s, the 
Czech government was in desperate need of hard currency in order to help move 
along the privatization of the economy. To solve this problem, the Czech 
government began selling weapons to politically turbulent countries throughout 
Southeastern Europe and the Middle East.163 With its own interests at stake, the 
US had asked the Czechs cease these activities, as it was only exacerbating 
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tensions in these regions. In response to the US request, the Czechs promised to 
no longer sell weapons to these parts of the world in fear of losing aid and 
support from one of their most powerful allies and most fervent supporters.164 In 
a way, this situation helped develop trust between the two countries, which would 
soon blossom into the Atlantic relationship still practiced today.  
Economic Developments/Struggles 
Unlike its political transition, the Czech Republic’s economic transition 
process went a lot smoother than the other countries in the Visegrad Group. 
Because of Klaus’s economic reform policies in the early years, the Czech 
people experienced a time of prosperity by the mid to late 90’s. For instance, with 
the new economic reforms the Czechs were able to establish laws of restitution 
for those who had lost property under the communist regime as well as laws on 
privatization and lands for small and large corporations.165 Other effects included 
balancing the national budget, introducing a new tax system based on Western 
models and finally adopting a social security system that significantly 
decentralized the former welfare administration.166 By 1993, unemployment had 
fallen below 3% while inflation was brought down to a manageable level.167 
Under Klaus’s government, the Czech Republic experienced a budget surplus 
and even a 16% expansion of Czech exports.  
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3 Slovakia 
Political Transition 
It has already been mentioned that unlike the other three, Slovakia had a 
far more difficult time decentralizing political governance and reforming its 
economy. According to historian Lonnie Johnson the reason behind this can be 
attributed to two factors. First, after the split with the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
possessed a “lopsided industrial profile based partly on armament production 
and traditionally underdeveloped agricultural regions.”168 Second, the rise of both 
Vladimir Meciar and of Slovak nationalism would greatly effect the political and 
economic development of Slovakia.169 Meciar, a strong, directive, and 
charismatic leader, was much different from his Visegrad counterparts. Unlike the 
newly elected leaders of the Czech Republic, Meciar wanted to return Slovakia to 
a time when opposition was discouraged and political leaders controlled the 
media.170 Suppressing opposition was accompanied by discrimination against 
minorities within the country, including Czechs, Hungarians, Roma, and 
Ruthenians. Essentially, the Meciar government didn’t see non-Slovaks as 
natural citizens so their needs and wants would always come second to those of 
Slovaks, as they had under Josef Tiso during the period of the Slovak state 
during the Second World War, but without the property confiscations, expulsions 
and deportations.  
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Other issues facing the newly independent nation included the lack of a 
separate state infrastructure and the problem of international recognition. With 
regard to infrastructure, as mentioned, the federal Czechoslovak government had 
been almost entirely located in Prague, so after the split Slovakia had nowhere to 
conduct its governmental business.171 Slovakia was left on its own to build 
administrative and governmental buildings in its capital of Bratislava, costing the 
country millions. 
In terms of its need for international recognition, Meciar thought it was 
imperative that he convince others countries that Slovakia was worth investing in. 
However, unlike the other three Visegrad countries Slovakia turned its attention 
east toward the Russian Federation. Because Meciar put the brakes on 
economic reform, his policies were not well received by the EU and US. Knowing 
this, he sought to build strong relations with Russia in hopes that the former 
dominant power in the region would not only recognize Slovakia, but also send 
aid.172 However Meciar also had a hidden agenda with regards to his relationship 
with Russia. Meciar hoped to use his ties with the Russian Federation as a “lever 
in dealing with the European Union and the United States on trade and security 
issues.”173 However, a closer relationship with a Russia itself in political and 
economic crisis in the 1990s couldn’t help Meciar when economic problems 
caused by his policies occurred. But before jumping into Meciar’s economic 
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policies, it is important to highlight some of the achievements that came out of 
the establishment of an independent Slovakia. 
In Slovakia Since Independence, author Milton Goldman explains that 
while there were plenty of problems plaguing Slovakia in the early 90’s, there 
was progress toward liberalization and democracy, even if it occurred in small 
steps. Goldman points out that even at a slow pace, the people of Slovakia were 
ready to move toward liberalism and true democracy.174 But it wasn’t just the 
Slovak people; newly elected politicians also began to change how they 
envisioned government and its relationship to people. Specifically, Slovak 
politicians who had been completely corrupted and influenced by the Communist 
party now began to play by a new set of rules set up by the new Slovakian 
government.175 The Slovak parliament was strong enough to block any new 
dictatorial aspirations, and was able to give the power of the vote back to the 
people of Slovakia, even if Slovak voters initially supported Meciar.176 While this 
may be far less of a success than that experienced by the other three Visegrad 
countries, it is still important to recognize Slovakia’s trend from communist 
control to democratic reform. Thus, when the economy in Slovakia began to take 
a major downturn in early 1994, Meciar’s popularity also sank.  
Economic Developments/Struggles 
Once the separation of Czechoslovakia occurred, Meciar dramatically 
slowed down the privatization of the economy. For example, by 1994 only 5% of 
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state-owned businesses were privatized which led to little foreign investment that 
year.177 In general, the Slovak economy by 1994 could be considered stagnant, 
as no new policies were coming forward to promote privatization and move 
Slovakia away from an economy dominated by the state. Because of this, at the 
end of 1994, Meciar would be unseated as Prime Minister by the Parliament and 
replaced by Jozef Moravick. Moravick, backed by then president Michal Kovac, 
had to form a coalition government in an attempt to achieve consensus on how to 
privatize the economy without worsening the situation. However, in the 
September ’94 elections Meciar and his MDS party were able to gain 35% of the 
vote and form a coalition government with the Association of Workers of 
Slovakia, a far right party and Meciar returned as Prime Minister.178  
With regards to the economy, Slovakia moved forward with economic 
reform, though it was still at a slower pace than in the other Visegrad countries. 
Earlier, a major success occurred in 1993 when the IMF gave Slovakia $90 
million in loans in order to support its currency reserves, which now allowed 
banks to provide more credit to privatizing companies.179 Other accomplishments 
made by the Slovakian government included cutting back on the increasingly 
expensive social safety net and subsidies to inefficient state-controlled 
enterprises. Finally the government pursued policies that would “curtail imports 
from hard-currency countries to bolster its own currency, with a view eventually 
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to making it convertible.”180 An example of this would be the 20% surcharge 
imposed on imports from the EU and European Free trade Area.181 These 
policies, though painful at first, would lead Slovakia to becoming one of Europe’s 
most successful economies by the early 2000’s. However, this discussion will be 
saved for the last chapter that deals with present developments in the Visegrad 
countries.  
The Odd Man Out 
In Chapter 4 the reader will notice that when discussing Visegrad’s move 
into NATO with the help of the US, Slovakia is mentioned very little. This is 
because Slovakia, led by Meciar until 1998, would fail to address its institutional 
problems, there by disqualifying itself from the enlargement process in the late 
90’s. Reasons behind this, as mentioned above, included Meciar’s anti-
democratic approach to politics, as well as illegal activities the former Prime 
Minister was involved with.182 Kenney shows that allegations of kidnapping, 
torture, and even murder were a common practice during Meciar’s tenure. When 
word of these activities reached both NATO and the US there was no one left to 
support Slovakia’s candidacy to the military alliance. However, a Visegrad 
Presidential Report from 1999 shows that the other three countries “called upon 
the Alliance to admit another V4 country, Slovakia, as soon as possible.”183 What 
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this shows is that while the V4 was not necessarily on the same timeline for 
accession into NATO and later the Atlantic World, they were all still united on the 
issue that every member of the V4 needed to be secured.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the transition processes within the Visegrad 
countries following the collapse of communist rule. Many political and economic 
issues arose during the transition process, but these countries were able to move 
forward at different paces as governments and politicians fought hard for 
implementation of their policies. While many of these policies may have been 
controversial, some would greatly benefit the future of these countries. One of 
these benefits was attracting the attention and favors of Western countries, 
including members of the EU and more importantly the US. The political 
leadership of one country, Slovakia, initially made the decision that it wasn’t 
interested in pursuing the same path as its neighbors and instead chose a much 
slower and politically less painful route. Because of this choice, as well as the 
authoritarian style of Vladimir Meciar and his MDS government, western 
countries would be more hesitant in extending an invitation to Slovakia into the 
Atlantic world, most notably membership into NATO. Following a change in 
political leadership, however, by the mid-2000’s Slovakia would go on to become 
an economic success story and a member of both NATO and the European 
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Union.  Having established this context of political and economic transition, 
attention can now be turned to the U.S.’s role in Central Europe’s move into the 
Atlantic world. 
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Chapter 3: The Clinton Administration 
Atlanticism reached its apex during the Clinton Administration and 
continued to dominate US foreign policy until about 2000, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court declared George W. Bush the controversial winner of that year’s 
presidential election. It was during the Clinton years that the relationship between 
the US and the V4 was at its strongest. This had much to do with the fact that 
Clinton was something of a liberal internationalist in that he wanted to support 
democracy and economic reforms in to the newly established V4. This chapter 
will primarily focus on the attitudes and goals of the Clinton Administration to 
better understand the significance of this relationship. Furthermore this chapter 
will examine the policies put in place that helped bring the former Eastern Bloc 
countries into the Atlantic world. It will also be imperative to take a look at the role 
of the Yugoslav Wars, as they would increase the U.S.’s attention to the Central 
European region. By analyzing and critiquing U.S. policies and the role of the 
Yugoslav Wars, it will be seen that in many ways it was because of their ties to 
the US that the V4 was better able to engage the European Union, and indeed 
the wider world. However, before delving further into this topic, it is important to 
note that glimpses of Atlanticism can be seen between the US and V4 countries 
long before the Clinton Administration. 
Atlanticism before Clinton 
1 From Wilson to the Cold War   
Political Scientist Bennet Kovrig shows that U.S. and central European 
relations began at the end of W.W. I when President Woodrow Wilson issued his 
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vision of national “self-determination” which was the belief that states had the 
right to determine their own future without outside interference.184 Self-
determination would become a backbone philosophy to US foreign policy and 
would be used to “legitimate its participation and forge a more peaceful and 
democratic order in Europe.”185 An example of this would be in the form of 
Wilson’s 14 point plan which would go on to influence many East/Central 
European states who believed in “the universality of the principle of justice to all 
peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and 
safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.”186 However, while the 
U.S. talked of supporting East and Central European states right to self-
determination, what actually occurred was a period of isolationism that 
undermined this practice. With this lack of support East and Central European 
countries would fall under the influence of the future powers of the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany. The U.S. would not engage with these countries again until 
the start of the Cold War.  
Both Kovrig as well as historian Walter Hixson show that during the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, relations with central Europe would 
again come to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. Interactions would come in the 
form of the policies enacted during these administrations that were a mix of 
tactical and “psychological warfare” policies.187 Kovrig, shows us that three 
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policies used by the U.S. at the beginning of the Cold War included the “Roll 
back,” “Liberation,” and “Captive Nations” policies. All three of these policies 
were based on propaganda, a cornerstone to US foreign policy during this 
period, that both Americans and East/Central Europeans should view the Soviet 
Union as an evil occupying force.188 The rollback policy was meant as a way to 
try and gradually move the Soviet line back through means of negotiation, 
economic sanctions etc.189 Liberation policy was to be used to promote unrest 
within a certain state or region and promote insurgency in order to overthrow 
Soviet forces.190 Finally, the captive nations policy was just a general way to 
paint the Soviet Union as an evil occupying force and would be used to “reassure 
eastern Europeans and generate a spiritual power that would ultimately 
overcome Soviet dictatorship.”191 However with regards to actual military 
engagement, Kovrig points out, that in reality “it is highly unlikely that any 
American president would ever have seriously considered taking such a risk for 
the sake of freeing a small, faraway country.”192 Because of this U.S. foreign 
policy would turn to other means of trying to overthrow the Soviet Union.  
In his book Parting the Curtain, Walter Hixson shows how the U.S. used 
gradual cultural infiltration to try and destabilize the Soviet and eastern European 
Communist party. Examples of cultural infiltration included trying to advertise to 
citizens in occupied countries through radio and television broadcasts the 
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wonders of western consumer culture including Pepsi-Cola, Cadillac cars, 
designer clothes and the beauty of fashion models.193 The point of all of this was 
to try and show East-Central Europeans that they too could have a life filled with 
exotic consumer goods if only they could overthrow their occupying government. 
This would all amount to a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations when on January 
27, 1958 a cultural exchange agreement was signed.194 This would lead to an 
exchange of “radio and television broadcasts, feature and documentary films, 
students and professors, artists and writers, scientists and agricultural experts, 
athletes, youth and civic groups” to name a few. 195 By the summer of 1959 an 
American National Exhibition was scheduled in Moscow. This event would be 
used as an opportunity to display the very best of western consumer culture to 
the Soviet Union and it’s republics.196 However, at the end of the Eisenhower 
administration both the tactical and psychological warfare policies would be 
greatly buried due to a number of reason including the fact that propaganda by 
this time had greatly calmed down and the U.S. could no longer justify using 
policies that incited violent revolutions within a country. What replaced these 
policies was just a military build by both superpowers that would lead to a nuclear 
arms race. It would not be until the 1970’s that U.S. and central European 
relations would resurface.  
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2 The Carter Administration 
The Cold War and relations between the US and the Communist world 
drastically changed after the early 1970’s due to the policy of détente pursued by 
the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Détente was a policy that strived to ease 
tension between the US and the Soviet Union in order to build common ground 
between the two superpowers. An example of this can be seen from the 1975 
Helsinki Accords where 35 nations, including the US and USSR, signed 
agreements, known as “baskets” to ease tensions between the Western and 
Communist worlds.197 One of the most important agreements, known as “basket 
3”, stated that the Soviets had to recognize “”human rights, including the freedom 
of emigration and reunification of families divided by international borders, 
cultural exchanges and freedom of the press.”198 I only mention this basket 
because it would prove to be significant in inspiring pro-human rights groups 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe which is important to understanding the 
1989 revolutions previously discussed in Chapter 2.199 
Because of this détente, future administrations would be able to have 
more access to not only the Communist world, but also specifically Central 
Europe. Historian Minton F. Goldman suggests that the Atlanticism between the 
US, and specifically the future V4 countries had its roots in the late 1970’s when 
President Jimmy Carter was in office. Goldman believes that during Carter’s 
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administration, the president’s foreign policy goals focused heavily on human 
rights violations of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which had been meant to serve as 
the symbolic culmination of détente.200 By focusing on human rights violations, 
Carter was able to “encourage an expansion of dissident activity and the 
emergence of a political opposition.”201 Carter visited Warsaw, Poland in 1977 in 
hopes of voicing his concern for human-rights violations, as well as to engage the 
Polish government which was then led by Communist Party First Secretary, 
Edward Gierek.202 In doing this, Carter was giving support to opponents of the 
ruling regime. While these initiatives may have seemed to have had little effect at 
the time, they helped to forge the foundation of the future relationship between 
the US and V4 countries. They instilled a connection between Central Europe 
and the US, and ultimately, influenced the decision of the region’s states to reach 
out for help when the Communist regime collapsed. 
However, it is important to note that unlike Bill Clinton, Carter had 
surrounded himself with foreign policy advisors who were often at odds. On the  
one hand, there was Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who championed the 
continuation of detente.203 Vance believed it was wrong to approach foreign 
policy with a combative attitude. Instead, Vance argued that it would be more 
effective if Carter’s administration took a step back and consider the world as a 
highly complex and developing place.  
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At the same time, President Carter also received foreign policy advice 
from Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Council Director. Brzezinski, 
unlike Vance, believed that while détente was important, the US should also 
pursue more comprehensive and reciprocal policies that would “enhance peace 
and promote change within the communist system.”204 Specifically, Brzezinski 
was interested in steering the Carter administration into taking a more activist 
approach to the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The idea would be to 
expand relations with Central and Eastern European countries “for its own sake 
and not merely as a by-product of détente with the Soviet Union.”205 This would 
include undermining Soviet domination and hardline communist regimes by 
supporting opposition movements like KOR and Charter 77 that called upon their 
states to respect the human rights agreements they had signed.206 Brzezinski 
would also advocate US support for Radio Free Europe, which he saw as an 
instrument that could bring about change in the region. The main point of 
Brzezinski’s policies revolved around small and incremental, not radical, change 
that would help destabilize Soviet domination.207  
Swayed by the varying views of Vance and Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s 
foreign policy sought both the continuation of détente with the Soviet Union as 
well as the support for human rights within the Soviet bloc. Ultimately, this lack of 
a singular vision of foreign policy, on top of Carter’s inability to resolve the Iran 
                                            
204 Kovrig, 125.  
205 Ibid.  
206 LaFeber, 682.  
207 Kovrig, 125-129.  
Brian Valdivia 74  
hostage crisis, has largely shaped our view of the Carter Administration as 
ineffectual. 
3 The Reagan Administration 
During the first half of the Regan administration, relations between the US 
and Communist world reverted largely back to the pre-détente era of the Cold 
War. Détente was no longer the modus operandi of Washington; instead, 
Reagan’s new foreign policy would be built on four cornerstones. The reason for 
abandoning détente and adopting a new foreign policy was due to the crisis that 
culminated in Poland in December of 1981. Historian Bennett Kovrig shows that 
due to the rise of the newly formed Solidarity Trade Union that began to 
campaign for more freedoms within Poland, both the Kremlin and then leader of 
Communist Poland General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared a “state of war” and 
placed Poland under martial law.208 The reason behind this was to stop the 
Solidarity movement from gaining further influence in the communist-dominated 
political sphere. The Party would go onto to arrest many activists and leaders of 
the trade union. However the Reagan administration, specifically those in the 
Pentagon, saw this as opportunity to press for a “tougher policy of economic 
isolation and destabilization of the Soviet Bloc.”209 What would follow was a 
deterioration of Soviet and US relations that would lead to economic sanctions as 
well as beefed-up military spending. In Walter LaFeber’s The American Age, the 
author describes the four cornerstones of Reagan’s new policy, explaining that 
the first cornerstone was that Reagan believed that America needed someone 
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who had a commanding presence.210 Reagan sought to strengthen his 
presidential powers, thereby allowing him to increase military spending; 
rearmament, of course, flew in the face of détente.  
The second cornerstone was reviving the age-old anti-communist 
narrative. Instead of taking a constructivist stance, similar to what the former 
Secretary of State Vance, Reagan saw Communism as the source of the world’s 
problems. In 1980, Reagan stated that, “The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest 
that is going on. If they hadn’t engaged in their game of dominoes, there wouldn’t 
be any hot spots in the world.”211 The notion of a “Domino Theory” is reminiscent 
of the rhetoric used by former president Harry Truman in the late 1940’s that 
justified the US policy of containment at the outset of the Cold War. This theory 
stated that if communism wasn’t contained and one country fell to communism, 
then the surrounding region would also fall into its sphere of influence. What is 
critical to note is that when Jimmy Carter left office the American people, as well 
as the outside world saw US foreign policy as weak and lacking in purpose. In 
many ways, Reagan was wise to revert to this distrustful, and at times, combative 
stance towards Communism, as it had always been a popular one. In this way, 
Reagan was able to use the long-time fear of communism, which at times 
degenerated into hysteria, to propel himself into becoming one of the most 
popular political figures in U.S. history. 
The third cornerstone of Regan’s foreign policy agenda was to highlight 
the distinction between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” governments. Reagan’s 
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U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeane J. Fitzpatrick, had argued at the time that the 
difference between the two laid in the fact that “authoritarian” governments, such 
as those in South Africa and Argentina, were more stable, more likely to evolve 
into future democratic systems because of their positive view of capitalism and 
foreign investors, and in general they tended to have a more favorable 
relationship with the US.212  “Totalitarian” governments on the other hand, such 
as those of the Soviet Union and China ruled by communists, showed less signs 
of democratizing, despised capitalism, and opposed U.S. interests.213 With this 
mindset, Reagan restarted the arms race with the Soviet Union. 
Finally, Reagan’s fourth cornerstone of foreign policy pledged to raise 
military spending by 40% between 1980-84.214 This included a massive nuclear 
build up and expanding the Navy to 600 ships. It is interesting to point out that by 
1981, when Reagan took office, the CIA had already knew that the US was 
already equal, if not superior to the Soviet Union in military capabilities,215 which 
begs the question, why did the United States increase military spending? 
During Reagan’s first term in office, U.S. foreign policy went back to pre-
détente years. However, during his second term in office the relationship 
between the US and Soviet Union improved. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to 
power in 1985, the Soviet Union was in a downward economic and political spiral 
that quickly needed to be fixed. During his time as General Secretary of the 
Soviet Union, Gorbachev would promote a new Soviet policy that preached “unity 
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in diversity” and called for the reopening of dialogue with the west.216  This would 
eventually lead to arms reduction talks between the two superpowers which 
many had thought unimaginable just a few years before. Another major 
improvement was the reestablishment of trust between the Soviet Union and US, 
which would in turn reopen discussions on trade.217 However, even with a new 
take on how the Soviet world could be reformed Gorbachev’s ideas wouldn’t be 
able to curb Central and Easter Europe’s desire for freedom.  
4 The Bush Administration 
By the time George H.W. Bush had entered office as president in 1989, 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc were on the verge of collapse. With this in 
mind, Bush knew that he would have to take a stance on whether or not to help 
the soon to be newly independent countries. Initially, the Bush Administration 
was skeptical about the newly elected leaderships coming out of Central Europe 
and the possibility of democracy and capitalism taking root. This may have had 
something to do with the fact that many people at the time believed that the 
Soviet Union under Gorbachev would successfully reform itself and preserve 
communist rule. Bush called for a continuation of the arms negotiations as well 
as the reform process in the Eastern Bloc countries.218 However it should be 
noted that Bush had to tread a fine line when it came to supporting Central and 
Eastern European countries so as not to anger the Soviets. President Bush 
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stressed that if change was going to come to Central and Eastern Europe it 
would have to come from within.219  
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it came as a shock; nobody 
thought that the regime was ever going to fall. Because of this unexpected twist, 
it took time for U.S. foreign policy to adjust to the new situation. President Bush 
was hesitant; he wanted to see if both Central and Eastern Europe could make 
the necessary reforms rather than simply rely on large infusions of foreign 
capital.220 However, this is not to say that the future Visegrad countries didn’t 
receive any help from the U.S. in the early 1990’s. After the fall of communism 
and the Soviet Union, many in Congress came out in support of the Central and 
Eastern European transition to political democracy and free-market economies. 
Specifically, former Senator Bob Dole became an avid supporter of US aid to the 
future V4 countries. However, even with this support in Congress, the Bush 
Administration had other troubles to worry about. During this period, the Bush 
Administration became embroiled with issues in the Persian Gulf and Latin 
America, as well as issues resulting from the break-up of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. Because of these concerns, the amount of time and resources that 
could be dedicated to helping Central and Eastern Europe were limited, although 
President Bush was able to urge the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
“change its lending regulations so that it could provide extra money to pay for 
high-priced oil imports.”221 During the Persian Gulf War (1990-92), Kuwaiti and 
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Iraqi oil exports were disrupted, which created an energy crisis in Europe, leading 
the price of oil to skyrocket. Bush recognized the risk this represented and knew 
he had to step in so that the newly established democracies of Central Europe 
could sustain themselves.  
As discussed above, the relationship between the US and the V4 actually 
has its roots in Wilson’s support for self-determination; from here relations 
between the two regions would not see a significance of change until the 
outbreak of the Cold War. A period of militarization and psychological warfare 
would occur during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations only to be 
reduced to a nuclear arms race. It wouldn’t be till the Helsinki accords in the 
1970’s that the US and the Carter Administration would be able to begin building 
bridges between America and Central Europe. However, after this period the US 
went right back to old Cold War tactics until the rise of Gorbachev presented new 
opportunities for negotiations and engagement. It was not until after the collapse 
of Communism in late 1989 and the 1990’s that the US would again begin to 
provide tangible support to the future V4 countries. With this understanding, 
focus can now turn to the administration that took what was perhaps the 
strongest stance on what the US’s role should be with regard to the future of 
Central Europe. 
Clinton and Visegrad  
 By reading the autobiographies of former President Bill Clinton and his 
former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, it is evident that these two leaders 
had numerous ties and reasons to help bring the V3 (initially just Poland, 
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Hungary, and the Czech Republic) in to the Atlantic World. With regard to 
Clinton, the former President had spent the better part of a year (1969-70) in his 
youth traveling throughout Europe and the Eastern Bloc, and held places such as 
Prague and Budapest close to his heart due to his personal experiences with the 
people and their culture. In Clinton’s autobiography, My Life, the former president 
looks back with particular fondness on his friendship with a Czech colleague he 
had met while studying at Oxford University in England, Jan Kopold.222 Later, 
Clinton spent a week in Prague with Kopold and his family, who soon came to 
see Clinton as another son.223 This experience would have a major impact on his 
future foreign policy as this trip came to hold a special place in his heart. It also 
showed Clinton that the US could be seen as a beacon of hope for people, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Prague Spring and Soviet invasion, struggling 
under the yoke of communism.224 However, as Ronald Asmus points out, while 
Clinton’s administration claim to have altruistic motives it is important to point out 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union created a geo-strategic vacuum in Central 
and Eastern Europe that provided an opportunity for the US to expand its political 
and military influence.225 It is imperative that while reading through information 
given by Clinton and his administration, even if there motives for wanting to help 
the V4 are sincere, to remember that NATO enlargement at this time was also 
part of a larger battle to show the world what the US stood for. This event would 
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also help solidify the US’s relevance and role as the dominant military force in the 
world which would influence history and events in years to come. Before diving 
into the policies and work that led to the acceptance of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic into NATO in 1999, an understanding of why foreign policy 
toward the V3 countries changed from one of mostly ambivalence to one of 
focused interest.  
1 Factors for Change:  
Before the NATO invitation in 1997, there had been many arguments for 
and against the idea of expanding NATO membership to Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. In The Burdens of Freedom, historian Padraic Kenney 
shows that four specific factors would lead to a major change in favor of NATO 
expansion to these countries. The First, as mentioned previously, was that 
unknown Russian intentions frightened both Central Europe as well as the US. At 
the time, many believed that Russia needed to be “kept in check” so that it could 
not form a new version of the Soviet Union.226 There was also the argument that 
there could not be European Security without Central and even Eastern Europe.  
Secondly, there was an element of U.S. domestic concern that also played 
a hand in the U.S. pushing for Central Europe’s acceptance into NATO. While 
Clinton’s actions to bring the V3 countries into NATO seem to be based on 
sincere motives, one must ask if this move was also influenced by Clinton’s own 
goal of making a bold political move that would solidify his place in history.227 It 
should be pointed out that Clinton was also pushed by his own administration to 
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prove “his and his party’s foreign party credentials.”228 Public opinion at the time 
tended to favor Republican views on issues of foreign policy so this can certainly 
be seen as a chance for Clinton to show how his party was up to the task of 
dealing with foreign affairs. Shortly after coming into office in 1993, Clinton stated 
that he wanted to “create a Europe that was united, free, democratic, and secure 
for the first time in History.”229 Once again it is imperative to be aware that NATO 
expansion was a way to solidify the US’s role as a world police force. Whether 
his motives were based on personal and strategic goals or goals that pursued a 
stronger relationship with Central and Eastern Europe is up to future historians to 
decide. 
The third factor that contributed to the increase of U.S. attention toward 
Central Europe was the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s. As will be discussed, the 
role of some in the V3 during the Yugoslav Wars, as well as their strategic 
locations, made the U.S. and NATO very interested in building alliances that 
could aid in ending the crisis.  
Finally, as discussed, the Clinton Administration saw that the EU was in 
no way ready to extend membership to the newly independent countries. This 
meant that help would have to come from the U.S. and Clinton would make it one 
of the cornerstones of his foreign policy initiatives while in office.  
2 A New Foreign Policy 
In June of 1993, the Clinton Administration had approved a new foreign 
policy initiative directed specifically at Central and Eastern Europe. Clinton’s new 
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policy, broadly defined, was based in bolstering democracies in all the newly 
independent countries, reducing trade barriers in order to help stimulate 
economic growth, and rewarding nations who succeeded in completing economic 
reforms.230 Specifically, the policy would be guided by four principles that, if 
implemented correctly, would place Central and Eastern European countries on 
the road to membership in NATO, the organization that would both guarantee 
their security and usher them into the Atlantic world. The first principle was to 
establish that NATO was the only organization in Europe that could safeguard 
European security.231 According to Asmus at the time the view was that “NATO 
must be as effective in dealing with future threats as it was in meeting the Soviet 
threat during the cold war.”232 This meant that no other organization or institution 
could replace or challenge the military capability that NATO had in Europe. Such 
a distinction would help prevent another cold war from breaking out in which two 
military alliances compete with each other. 
The second principle behind Clinton’s new foreign policy stated that it 
would not be fair or right for NATO to deny acceptance to the newly liberated 
Eastern Bloc countries and Soviet Republics.233 If NATO was going to fight for 
peace and democracy in Western Europe, then the next natural step would be to 
include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they too were striving for 
political and economic freedoms. As will be discussed, Madeline Albright and 
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John Shalikashvili also had deeply personal reasons for why they wanted to 
ensure that the V3 countries were brought into the secure realm of the Atlantic 
world.  
The third principle guiding Clinton’s policy was to use the prospect of 
joining NATO as a way to convince countries to “ensure civilian command of their 
armed forces, liberalize their economies and respect rights of minorities.”234 This 
was a crucial element to Clinton’s policy, as the region’s communist era’s military 
forces had served as instruments in the hands of party leaderships. Ensuring that 
the military was under civilian control of largely non-partisan political institutions 
meant that authoritarian regimes could not easily use it as a means to take 
power. With regard to minorities, this principle was designed to ensure that 
questions like what to do with the Roma would be handled delicately and with 
respect for their basic human rights. 
Finally, Central and Eastern Europe had to understand that NATO 
enlargement needed to be a gradual process.235 This is largely because once the 
US announced its plan for NATO expansion, the Russian Federation, and 
specifically Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, became worried that the 
Western world would try and build a military wall between Russia and Europe. 
One of the major arguments against NATO expansion at the time was that 
wherever the NATO alliance line ended, Russia would be sure to secure and 
fortify the neighboring area to the east.236 President Clinton took this matter to 
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heart, constantly reassuring Yeltsin that Central and Eastern Europe’s security 
and stability within NATO also served Russia’s interests. 
Thus, Clinton had a clear-cut strategy on how to deal with the former 
Communist countries as they sought to join the Atlantic World. Unlike his 
predecessors, Clinton was ready to build a new bridge between the East and 
West and unite these worlds into one functioning and peaceful international 
system. Also, unlike President Carter, Clinton had surrounded himself with 
largely like-minded foreign policy advisors who would play a critical role in 
developing the relationship between the US and V4 countries.  
3 Albright and Shalikashvili 
As mentioned, former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, and former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, had a special interest in 
the successful integration of the V3 countries into the European Community and 
Atlantic world. Both Albright and Shalikashvili had been born in Central Europe 
but were forced to escape in order to survive. Albright, who refers to herself as a 
“daughter of Czechoslovakia,” was driven out in 1938 because of her family’s 
fear of the invading Nazi army.237 Because of this, Albright had always yearned 
to know more about her homeland, which led to a long career of studying and 
teaching about the impact of Communism on the Eastern Bloc. It is interesting to 
note that during her doctoral program she would be advised by former National 
Security Council Director Zbigniew Brzezinski and would also be heavily 
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influenced by none other than Vaclav Havel, former President of the Czech 
Republic. 
Albright had met Havel in the late 1960’s when he was known as a 
successful playwright and the emerging leading dissident against the Communist 
regime in Czechoslovakia.238 Over the years, the two stayed in touch with 
Albright even writing her dissertation, supervised by Brzezinski, on the events 
surrounding Havel and Czechoslovakia’s fight for freedom.239 Because of this 
close-knit relationship, President Havel had Albright serve as his translator and 
advisor when he first visited the US in 1989.240 Later, in 1990, Havel brought his 
friend to Prague in order to help him set up the new presidential office at 
Hradčany castle.241 In 1993, Albright arranged a large party in Washington DC to 
celebrate Havel’s appointment as President of the Czech Republic.242 The guest 
list included the President and First Lady of the US, who were entertained by a 
performance by the young jazz guitar virtuoso, Kevin Whitfield (a favorite of 
Havel’s).243 It was rumored that in September of 1998, Havel even suggested 
that Albright succeed him in becoming the next President of the Czech 
Republic.244 However, the Clinton Administration had other plans in store for Mrs. 
Albright. Because of her background, knowledge, love of the region, and close 
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bond with President Vaclav, it is no wonder that President Clinton appointed her 
Ambassador to the United Nations in 1993 and Secretary of State in 1997.245  
The other main actor in the strengthening of relations between the US and 
V4 was General John Shalikashvili, known to his friends as “Shali.” Shalikashvili, 
like Albright, had been born in Central Europe and was also forced to flee his 
homeland in Poland in 1944 due to the advancing Red Army.246 
Shalikashvili is also famous for being the father of the plan that would help 
get Central and Eastern Europe on the road to NATO acceptance, known as the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP). The PFP was essentially a way for the newly 
independent countries to “participate in military training exercises with NATO 
countries.”247 If countries were able to upgrade their military, maintain peaceful 
relations with their neighbors, and solidify democratic institutions, then it would 
be possible for the PFP countries to apply for full NATO Membership.248 
However, it should also be noted that the PFP also required members to “respect 
the inviolability of borders, something Bratislava had been trying to get 
Hungary…to do for some time.”249 This would also help resolve the long-standing 
differences between Hungary and Slovakia over the treatment of minorities.250 
The other countries that were welcomed into the PFP included Poland, Czech 
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Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Albania.251 However, not all of the 
invited members were excited about this new proposition. 
4 Selling the Partnership for Peace 
One of the more arduous tasks in forging the Atlantic relationship between 
the US and V3 was to convince the former Communist bloc countries that the 
PFP was the first step in coming into the European and Atlantic Communities. 
Upon hearing about the PFP, Polish President Lech Wałęsa called it “blackmail” 
and said the plan was “too little”.252 Wałęsa clearly wanted Poland to be accepted 
as a full member of NATO immediately in order to guarantee Poland’s security 
from historically hostile neighbors, primarily the Russian Federation. Aware of 
this skepticism, President Clinton sent Albright and Shalikashvili all over Central 
and Eastern Europe to convince the invited countries to partake in this plan prior 
to the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels.253 This head start was critical if 
the PFP was to be considered and established at the summit meeting. It was 
therefore up to Albright and Shalikashvili to convince Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic to join the PFP. Shalikashvili, known for being brief, laid out the 
PFP outline by stating: 
“You will come to Brussels…and we will give you a desk, a filing cabinet, 
and a phone. We’ll have people there with whom you can consult and plan. We’ll 
learn how to operate together as a military team. And we’ll develop 
communications and other equipment that are interoperable.”254  
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Within a short period of time, Albright and Shalikashvili were able to not only 
persuade Wałęsa, but also the rest of the invited PFP countries to sign 
agreements with NATO that would lead to future membership in the 
organization.255 They achieved this by assuring the political leaders of the PFP 
countries that this would be the best and quickest way to get into NATO officially, 
thereby ensuring their security. It is clear that Albright and Shalikashvili could not 
only relate to, but also communicate with Czech and Polish leaders in their own 
tongues that the US was deeply invested in the future of this region; why else 
would Clinton send two of his most trusted advisors? By January 10, 1994, 
NATO had approved the PFP in Brussels, and the V3, as well as much of the 
rest of Eastern Europe, were well on their way to integrating into the Atlantic 
World.256 However, not everyone with interests in the region was convinced that 
the PFP would be good for Central and Eastern Europe. 
5 The Yeltsin/Russian Dilemma 
Today, critics of this strategy like Polish diplomat Andrzej Ananicz claim 
that the PFP was just a way that the US could derail or stall the V3 from entering 
into NATO and the Atlantic world.257 However, what Ananicz fails to realize is that 
the PFP was not only executed for the benefit of the V3 and Eastern Europe; 
rather, it was also a way to appease the Russian Federation, which was afraid 
that the expansion of NATO could lead to another cold war. Throughout the 
entire PFP process, the Clinton Administration was concerned that NATO 
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expansion might be seen as “a new division of Europe farther to the East.”258 
This proved to be a valuable insight on Clinton’s part; upon hearing about the 
PFP, Russian President Boris Yeltsin immediately criticized this plan and claimed 
that the US was trying to start a “Cold Peace” by rushing to enlarge NATO into 
Central and Eastern Europe.259 It was up to Clinton himself to convince the 
Russian President that the PFP was simply a way to secure the new European 
countries’ democratic systems, and make clear that it was in no way aimed at 
Russia. However, by looking closer at the situation, it becomes evident that 
Yeltsin had no choice but to criticize the PFP plan because of an upcoming 
election in 1996. Yeltsin knew that if he remained silent about the PFP and the 
prospect of NATO enlargement, his political opponents could use this as a way to 
make Yeltsin look weak.260 Because of this, Clinton personally went to Helsinki in 
1997 to discuss NATO expansion with Yeltsin.261 In order to persuade Yeltsin to 
accept NATO enlargement, Clinton cleverly came up with a strategy that would 
sweeten the deal. Clinton wanted to offer Russia a spot in the G-7 Summit as 
well as the World Trade Organization (WTO).262 Before eventually accepting 
these terms, Yeltsin secretly asked Clinton to limit future expansion of NATO to 
former Warsaw Pact countries and to exclude the three former Soviet republics in 
the Baltic region as well as Ukraine. However, Clinton could not promise these 
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things and once again had to make clear that NATO was not interested in 
creating a barrier against Russia, but simply in the security and stability of the 
new democracies. One crucial element that helped sell the PFP and later NATO 
enlargement was that while new members would be covered by the Alliance’s 
“nuclear umbrella,” there would in fact be no new nuclear weapons within the V3 
countries. Also the V3 member states would not receive new troops stationed 
within their countries.263 Eventually Clinton was able to get Yeltsin to agree to the 
NATO expansion as well as a NATO-Russia agreement in exchange for the US 
promising to not station troops and missiles in the new NATO member states.264 
But it wasn’t just Clinton and his administration that brought the V3 countries into 
NATO; it is imperative to remember that their role in the Yugoslav wars 
throughout the 90’s played a significant part.  
The Yugoslav Wars  
Although Yugoslavia’s civil and border wars began in 1991, the V3 
Countries wouldn’t become engaged until around 1993. As mentioned, the 
reason the Yugoslav wars are an important factor for the three Visegrad 
countries who wanted to join NATO is that it gave them the opportunity to show 
how serious they were about not only joining the military organization but also the 
Atlantic world. Kenney shows us that the Yugoslav wars “transformed the 
relationship between the whole of Eastern Europe and the West from one of 
dependence to one more symbiotic.”265 At the same time the wars, and central 
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Europe’s involvement, also showed the US as well as Western Europe how 
much European security rested on deeper cooperation. With regards to their 
involvement with the Yugoslav Wars, both Poland and the Czech Republic 
contributed to peacekeeping forces that were used in both the Croatian and 
Bosnian Wars.266 Of the initial 60,000 NATO troops deployed in 1996 to Bosnia, 
1/6th of those soldiers were from PFP engaged countries.267 Hungary specifically 
would play somewhat of a more important role during the Yugoslav wars, as it 
was the only country that bordered the country. By 1995, the US and NATO 
wanted southern Hungary to be the staging ground for the deployment of US and 
NATO-led forces into Bosnia.268 The Taszar military airbase located in southern 
Hungary would be NATO’s access point into Yugoslavia and would be used to 
run bombing raids to help calm the crisis.269 Actions such as these helped show 
the US, NATO, and Western Europe that the above mentioned Visegrad 
countries could be counted on as allies in times of crisis. This would prove even 
more true in 2003 when the V4 countries became part of what was called the 
“coalition of the willing,” which was a composed list of countries who supported 
then US President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq.270 The importance of the 
coalition of the willing would be to show that the invasion of Iraq was legitimate 
and not just supported by the United States. Major countries including Germany 
                                            
266 Ibid.  
267 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Doors, 125.  
268 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Doors, 128.  
269 Ibid.  
270 Steve Schifferes, “US Names ‘Coalition of the Willing,” BBC News, 18, March 
2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm.  
 
Brian Valdivia 93  
and France were against the invasion so it was important for the US to look for 
supporters so that they wouldn’t look like a war mongering nation in the 
international community.271 Poland in particular would play the biggest role in the 
V4 as they, along with the United Kingdom and Australia, would contribute the 
highest number of invasion troops.272 It becomes clear that the V4 weren’t just an 
important ally during the Yugoslav wars but also future conflicts to come.  
 
Transitioning into NATO 
Before entering NATO all three of the Visegrad candidates had to show 
that they had met certain NATO qualifications in order to be even considered 
possible candidates. In Opening NATO’s Doors, Ronald Asmus shows us that 
the two main entities that would judge their qualifications were both NATO as a 
whole and the U.S. as its leading member. It is important to understand that 
unlike the EU, NATO has less specific criteria in order to become a member 
which means candidates tend to have more flexibility when applying for 
membership. With regards to NATO, the military alliance is concerned with two 
factors, performance of a country and strategic interest.273 Because of this 
ambiguity, the US would help aid the V3 by giving them their own set of criteria in 
order to help map out what exactly the V3 countries must do to gain membership 
in NATO. Named after US Secretary of Defense Bill Berry, the US issued the 
“Berry Principles” which were meant to serve as a guiding list of criteria that the 
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V3 countries needed to complete in order to have the US’s permission to join. 
The Principles included having a stable and fair democracy, a free market 
economy, civilian control of the military, settled borders, a resolution to minority 
and racial issues, and the compatibility of a nation’s armed forces with NATO.274 
All three of the candidates had trouble meeting at least one of the principles 
mentioned.  
1 The Czech Republic 
Two issues the Czech Republic had to face in order to be considered for 
membership into NATO included mending its relationship with two minority 
groups. First, the Czechs needed to “mend their fences with the Germans over 
the issue of expatriated Germans from the Sudetenland following WW II.”275 
President Havel quickly took care of this problem by creating better relations and 
issuing an official apology to Germany for the expulsion of Germans, in order to 
show how important NATO acceptance was to both him and his country.276 
The second issue facing the Czech Republic was dealing with the 
Moravian region of the country as its population called for its own autonomy after 
the Velvet Divorce. In the Czech Republic, after the split, a movement in Moravia 
occurred that called for more power and autonomy to the Moravian people. The 
Moravians at the time thought that the Prague government was overextending its 
rule, so this Czech-speaking regional minority called for more local power and 
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even a separate army.277 They were even prepared to establish their own state, 
which would be called the “Czech Lands”.278 Both Havel and Klaus refused to 
take the Moravians seriously and they had a negative view of any further 
divisions within the country. Instead Havel and Klaus made agreements with the 
region in the mid 1990’s to allow more of a role in “regulating policy in the social 
areas, notably education, health care, and social agreements”.279 With these two 
issues handled the only thing left for the Czech Republic to take care of was 
restructuring and reforming it’s military which was a necessity for all three of the 
NATO candidates.280 To accomplish this all three of the Visegrad countries would 
partake in drills and exercises over time in order to show that they were prepared 
in case a crisis were to ever break out.  
2 Hungary 
Just like the Czech Republic, Hungary also had to deal with minority 
issues that stemmed back to 1920 when the Treaty of Trianon was signed ending 
Hungary’s involvement with WW I. After the treaty was signed 2 million 
Hungarians became national minorities in neighboring states.281 Specifically, 
Hungary had to reach agreements with Slovakia and Romania on border issues 
in order for its candidacy to NATO to be considered. With this in mind in March of 
1995 Hungary reached an agreement with Slovakia in regard to minority rights in 
each country. Then in the fall of 1996, Hungary and Romania were able to reach 
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a settlement that would also call for the respect of minority rights.282 Finally 
attention can be turned to the last Visegrad country Poland had the most difficult 
time meeting the criteria set out in the Berry Principles.  
3 Poland 
The two problems inhibiting Poland from being accepted into NATO 
included a lack of effective control of the military by civilians, and an upsurge in 
anti-Semitism after the fall of communism. During his presidency, Lech Wałęsa 
saw himself as the people’s leader, meaning that all things that fell under the 
jurisdiction of the sate, including the military, were under his influence as the 
people had freely chosen him to represent them.283 With this in mind Walesa 
would build strong personal ties with leading military personnel who reported 
directly to him and did as he asked. This would in turn undercut the Ministry of 
Defense’s ability to lead the military effectively. This issue would not be solved 
until 1996 when the newly elected Polish President, Alexsandr Kwasniewski 
signed new legislation that gave power over the military back to the Minister of 
Defense and out of the executive branch.284  
With regard to Poland’s second problem, anti-Semitism, after the fall of 
communism both the Government as well as Catholic Church failed to step in 
and denounce and punish anti-Semitic rhetoric behavior. To this day anti-
Semitism in post communist Poland remains an important issue as many still 
have negative attitudes toward the Jewish people. At the time, in 1991, 1/3 of 
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Poles thought that Jewish influence was too great in Poland, even though there 
were only 3,000 Jews living in Poland at the time.285 As an overwhelming 
majority of the country is Catholic, one might think that the Catholic Church would 
stand firmly against such senseless hatred toward an already decimated 
population. Instead the opposite happened. In August of 1989, the head of the 
Polish Church Cardinal Jozef Glemp went on record saying that the Jewish 
people had been attacking Poles and Christians with the use of “Jewish-
controlled” media.286 Additionally, in June of 1995, the well-known priest Henryk 
Jankowski called for the removal of Jews from the government. Jankowski would 
go onto to claim that the Star of David, a treasured icon of the Jewish faith, was 
nothing more than an oppressive symbol, much like the swastika or hammer and 
sickle.287 What was most troublesome about this was that at the time, President 
Lech Wałęsa did not speak out against these anti-Semitic remarks; evidently the 
Polish president was simply not concerned about this issue. In the US, both 
Wałęsa and the government’s response to these hateful actions outraged many 
American Jews. In particular the American Jewish Community demanded that 
before President Clinton allow Poland to join NATO it must first deal with Anti-
Semitism within the country.288 To smooth relations, Polish Ambassador to the 
US Jerzy Kozminksi worked night and day for three years to improve the 
relationship between Poland and the American Jewish community. It also helped 
that when President Kwasniewski came to power the Polish government was 
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more sympathetic to the Jewish population and would criticize those who made 
Anti-Semitic comments.289 Eventually these actions led to the American Jewish 
Community to support and endorse Poland’s candidacy for NATO membership. 
 By 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had shown they were 
capable of integrating into NATO with little difficulty and would receive invitations 
to join the military organization at the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain.290 In the 
spring of 1998, the US Senate voted 80-19 in favor of allowing Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic into NATO.291 Finally in 1999, NATO had fully admitted 
these countries as they had met the requirements laid out by the PFP and the 
Berry Principles as well as for their supporting roles during the Yugoslav wars. 
Upon hearing the news that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had been 
accepted into NATO, Clinton made a quick speaking tour throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe and was met everywhere with chants of “USA! USA!”292  
Conclusion  
Displayed above was an in-depth look at the policies implemented by the 
US in order to bring the V4 countries, minus Slovakia, into the European and 
Atlantic communities. As seen in Chapter 3 Slovakia had a more difficult time 
during its transition period and was not able to reap the benefits that were 
provided by the U.S. to the other three Visegrad countries. Through a specified 
foreign policy built on first getting these new democracies stabilized and secured, 
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the US hoped to support both economic and political freedom in this part of the 
world for the first time in decades. With the help of Secretary Albright and 
General Shalikashvili, the Clinton Administration was able to bring three of the V4 
countries under the protection of NATO. Both Albright and Shalikashvili had 
personal reasons to want this project to succeed, and Clinton was insightful 
enough to capitalize on their passion for the people of this region. By placing 
former citizens of Central Europe in positions of leadership in his administration, 
Clinton was able to show that as a melting pot of cultures itself, the US was 
deeply committed to and invested in the future of this region and the proliferation 
of democratic ideals around the world. However it is imperative to be aware of 
the unprecedented opportunity the US had in expanding NATO which in turn 
expanded its influence both politically and militarily. The US cemented itself as 
the strongest world military force. That being said, the process had its barriers; 
then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, had been squarely against the idea of 
NATO expansion because he saw the move as coming at the expense of Russia. 
However, with subtle tactics and diplomacy, Clinton was able to convince his 
Russian counterpart that NATO was the right answer for the former Warsaw Pact 
states, as well as for Russia. Also discussed was how the three countries were 
able to use the Yugoslav wars as a way to demonstrate their military reliability, 
which further helped them become accepted into NATO. This military reliability 
would again be demonstrated when George W. Bush formed the coalition of the 
willing in order to carry out the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. With this understanding of 
the Clinton-era policies that helped forge this new relationship, the last chapter 
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will end by discussing the results of these efforts, to better understand how each 
country capitalized on its acceptance into the Atlantic world. 
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Ch. 4: Results and Conclusion 
Foreign Investments and the EU 
Once accepted in NATO, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic saw 
an increase in foreign investments that led to an expansion of their economies. 
Slovakia, while not originally accepted by NATO in 1999, would also see a rise in 
foreign investment, which would eventually help its government plead Slovakia’s 
case for acceptance into NATO.293 With regards to the EU, the process of 
acceptance for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic began back in July of 
1997 when the European Commission, the administrative body for the EU, 
entered negotiations with these countries for future membership.294 However, it 
should be noted that while negotiations had begun, there was still no guarantee 
that these countries would enter the EU any time soon. This is because the 
process for gaining entrance into the EU required extended negotiations and 
discussions on 30 separate chapters of accession criteria that ranged from topics 
such as agriculture to military policy.295 However, being in NATO had greatly 
helped Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as many of the requirements 
for the EU, such as military policy, were already established. By 2004, all of the 
V4 countries was deemed fit to join in what has been called  the “Big Bang” 
expansion.  
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With regards to foreign investment, Hungary was able to grow its 
industries in mining, metallurgy, construction material, textiles and 
pharmaceuticals.296 Between 1999 and 2007, Hungary saw a steady growth of 
national GDP and a fall of inflation that greatly benefitted the country after years 
of recession. However, Hungary was hit hard by the ‘07/’08 financial crisis and 
only now is beginning to recover from it. Nevertheless, with a 3.2% GDP increase 
in 2014, things are starting to look better for Hungary.297 It is important note that 
because of these hard times, the current ruling party, FIDESZ, has begun to turn 
away from its western neighbors in hopes of striking more business deals with 
Russia.298 Viktor Orban and his conservative colleagues have upset relations 
with the other V4 nations as well, as all four members seem to have mixed 
opinions on how relations with Russia should be handled, an issue that will be 
discussed in more depth. At the same time, they appear to be united in their 
approaches to the refugee crisis.  
The Czech Republic is considered one of the most developed and 
industrialized economies within Central Europe. After 1999, foreign and domestic 
investment in heavy/general machine building, iron and steel production, and the 
chemical industry helped usher in a period of steady economic growth.299 It is 
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interesting to point out that the Czech Republic was one of the few countries in 
Europe that was not profoundly affected by the ‘07/’08 financial crisis due to its 
stable banking system which is considered much more cautious in terms of 
lending than in many of its EU counterparts. 2014 even saw a GDP increase of 
2% with a 2.7% growth prediction for 2015.300 
Poland, which has become the largest economy in Central Europe and the 
6th largest in the EU, also saw steady economic growth throughout the early 
2000’s. Its major industries include energy production, steel, and agriculture, 
which currently employs 12.7% of the workforce in Poland.301 The average yearly 
growth rate during the early to mid-2000’s was around 6%; however, growth 
began to decline in 2007 as a result of the global financial crisis, even if Poland’s 
economy never fell into recession.302 Nevertheless, in 2014, Poland’s annual 
GDP growth was 3.2% and is currently staying steady.303 
Finally attention can be turned to the last and currently fastest growing 
economy of the Visegrad group, Slovakia. From 2001 to 2007, the country saw 
the highest sustained GDP growth in the entire EU, reaching 10.7% in 2007.304 
Slovaks could attribute its economic growth to the success of the service sector 
and automobile production, specifically Volkswagen, Peugeot, and KIA Motors.305 
However, just as many countries around the world, Slovakia was also affected by 
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the financial crisis of 2008 with a falling of economic growth and an increase in 
unemployment, currently at 12.1%.306 Finally Slovakia, unlike the other V4 
countries, is also a member of the Eurozone.  
With all of this economic success in the early 2000’s, the way the Visegrad 
countries interacted with one another and with outside partners such as the US 
and EU changed drastically. Once all of the V4 countries were brought into 
NATO and the EU, relations with the US started to decline as US foreign policy 
shifted its attention toward the Middle East. This was also a time period when the 
V4 turned inward in order to focus on their emerging economies. While still in 
existence today, the V4 and Atlanticism as a whole has changed its main focus 
from a political/economic relationship to a more military-focused one. 
Visegrad Refocused 
In November of 2014, the Visegrad Youth Forum met in Banská Bystrica, 
Slovakia to discuss the current challenges and future of the V4. In reading about 
the forum, it is evident that the overwhelming concern of young people is a need 
to restructure the overarching approaches of the V4 countries to several different 
key issues. These issues primarily center around the V4’s stance on the 2014 
Ukrainian Crisis, and the V4’s policies on energy security and independence.307 
With regard to the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, it is evident that both Hungary 
and the Czech Republic do not view the Russian invasion of Crimea as a 
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credible threat to their security.308 As mentioned above, both Viktor Orbán and 
FIDESZ are turning more and more to Russia for trade, topped by gas imports, 
but on top of this, some politicians in the Czech Republic even view Russia as a 
“reliable ally.”309 2014 was, in many ways, a year of confusion for the nations of 
the V4, as each had significantly different reactions to the events happening in 
Ukraine. Michal Koran, the Deputy Director of the Institute for International 
Relations in Prague, stated, “In 2014, we have all witnessed a sudden major dip 
in the Visegrad cooperation at political and strategic levels.”310 With this in mind, 
many seem to hope that 2015 will be seen as a “do over” year in order to come 
to a consensus over how the V4 will proceed in dealing with Russia.311 For young 
people, the answer for the V4 will lie in regional cooperation, as all four of these 
countries are not as strong in the area of foreign policy when negotiating by 
themselves. Essentially, for young people, the most important agenda item the 
V4 needs to accomplish in 2015 is a common policy on how to deal with Russian 
aggression so that the V4 can once again present a united stance to the world on 
this very important issue. 
As with many countries, another major area of concern for the future of the 
V4 is energy security and independence. At the beginning of this thesis, I 
mentioned that a significant problem in Europe today is its dependence on 
                                            
308 Jakub Kufack, “Czech Security Policy and the Ukraine Crisis,” Visegrad 
Insight, Res Publica Foundation, 2 Mar. 2015, http://visegradinsight.eu/czech-
security-policy-and-the-ukraine-crisis03032015/.  
309 Ibid.  
310 Michal Koran, “What will 2015 Hold for Central Europe,” Visegrad Insight, Res 
Publica Foundation, 5 Feb. 2015, http://visegradinsight.eu/what-will-2015-hold-
for-central-europe05022015/.  
311 Ibid.  
Brian Valdivia 106  
Russian oil and energy. Because of this dependency, many countries are unable 
to stand up to Russia in instances such as the crisis in Ukraine. With the events 
of March of 2014 heavily on their minds, one of the major concerns of young 
people is that the V4, especially Hungary and Slovakia, are far too dependent on 
Russian energy.312 Youth all across the V4 countries are calling for investments 
in new and sustainable sources of energy in order to promote energy security 
and independence. They believe that only through working together will the V4 
countries have the strength and ability to establish energy security for the 
future.313  
However, this is not to say that the V4 is at complete odds with one 
another on every issue. From Olaf Osica, Director of the Centre for Eastern 
Studies in Warsaw, it is clear that while there are new factors of tension among 
the member states there are still common interests such as the EU budget and 
environmental issues that will always need to be dealt with in some competitive 
manner.314 Another common factor is the V4’s continued support of NATO 
positions, even if it sometimes conflicts with their individual stances.315 This may 
have to do with the fact that some believe that “without NATO the region ceases 
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to exist as a whole in the dimension of security and defense.”316 Conflicts over 
policy have always existed in Visegrad, however their common interests and 
ability to work as a united front have always been one of the keys to their 
success. Currently the V4 is entering a “new model” which will be built not on a 
level of ideas but rather built on normal political debate.317 It will be imperative 
that the V4 try and improve their organization by taking several steps. These 
steps would include increasing national contributions to the International 
Visegrad Fund, the only permanent institution of the V4 that was established in 
the year 2000, continuing to push for equality for women and minorities, 
respecting different financial powers within each member state, and focusing on 
a the Eastern partnership.318 Another area of cooperation that has recently come 
to the forefront is how the V4 are working together in the development of the 
2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis, however it is not necessarily in the most positive 
light. Currently the V4 are completely against “any proposal leading to the 
introduction of mandatory and permanent quotas as solidarity measure would be 
unacceptable.”319 The V4 are going against the wants of both the European 
Commission and major countries like France as Germany as well as the Obama 
Administration who believe that the relocation of asylum seekers should occur in 
a timely manner.320 However, this is not to say that the V4 aren’t taking any 
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measure to deal with the crisis, rather they believe that the right path is to take on 
the root causes of the Refugee crisis. Currently all four countries are engaged 
with setting up safe camps for newly arrived refugees in order to give them 
somewhere to stay whilst applying for asylum.321 They believe that actions 
including working to find a solution to the civil war in Syria and confronting the 
terrorist organization ISIS more forcefully will solve the root causes of the 
crisis.322 What this stance shows, though while not necessarily the most positive, 
is that while many differences may exist, the V4 isn’t going anywhere anytime 
soon. From Tomas Strazay, head of the Central and Southeastern Europe 
Research Program in Bratislava, it is clear that V4 “cooperation is so 
multidimensional and well built that it’s not possible to just end it.”323  
Redefining Atlanticism 
Finally, the last major problem facing the V4 today is the issue of military 
cooperation and its role in the future of Atlanticism. Richard Sakwa, a professor 
of Russian and European Politics, notes that a new form of Atlanticism has 
developed since the mid-2000’s.324 Atlanticism, which at first was just based on 
strengthening the economic, political, and military relations between Europe and 
North America, has devolved into a focus simply on military relations, which is 
evident in the relationship that has developed between the EU and NATO with 
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regard to security policies. For example, it has become clear that, for better or 
worse, the “foreign and security dimensions of the EU has effectively merged 
with the Atlantic security community.”325 In simpler terms this means that in order 
for possible future members to join the EU, they will now have to align their 
security policies with those of NATO.326 
 The problem with the militarization of Atlanticism is that new tensions with 
Russia are emerging that could easily slip the world back into a Cold War 
confrontation.327 While NATO and the US might have a positive view of the 
expansion of this new form of Atlanticism, what it really does is undermine pan-
European security. Because the EU and NATO are edging closer to Russia’s 
borders, the Russian Federation feels pressured to defend what remains of its 
sphere of influence, the 2014 crisis in Ukraine being the most obvious example of 
this. Additionally, neither the US nor the EU has seemed to be able to let go of 
Cold War Era attitudes towards the actions of Russia, which are constantly 
questioned, or condemned.328 Sakwa states, “Any concession, or even 
understanding of the Russian position is considered weakness.”329 In order to 
avoid mounting tensions, the EU, US, and V4 countries are going to need to 
move away from this new form of Atlanticism, which is too heavily focused on the 
military alliance, and come back to policies built on political and economic 
cooperation. In light of the events in the Crimea and Ukraine, it will be important 
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to take note of Russian interests in its “near abroad” of former Soviet states, 
particularly those with large Russian minorities; otherwise, the Atlantic 




Four countries in Central Europe were able to rise from the ashes of 
communist rule and become politically democratic countries with free market 
economies. It was shown saw that the reason the V4 countries wanted to “return 
to Europe” was because of their long historical and cultural ties that stem back to 
the medieval period. Security from a possible Soviet Union revival also drove the 
V4 to look for help from western countries. With regards to the main 
characteristics of post-communist policies that helped the V4 integrate into 
western institutions, the V4 countries underwent a transformation period to prove 
that they were ready to become democratically stable countries. From examining 
their transition process it is clear that the Visegrad countries had difficulties 
during this period, including rising unemployment and inflation that had never 
been experienced before. Although Slovakia pursued gradual economic reform, 
which hampered economic development throughout the 90’s, the countries of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were able to move rather quickly from 
a communist command system to a system based on free market capitalism. 
Once the Clinton Administration recognized the security vacuum in the region by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, it decided to step in to help guide these newly 
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independent countries into the Atlantic World. However, the relationship between 
the US and V4 countries during the 1990’s is often downplayed due to the other 
world events that overshadowed these dealings. By pushing for their acceptance 
into NATO first, the US helped bring the V4 into western institutions which would 
help make western European countries see that the Visegrad group was ready to 
join the EU. Before doing this both the US, in the form of the Berry criteria, and 
NATO would set up criteria that the V4 had to meet in order to be accepted into 
the military organization. These included settling border, minority, military and 
political disputes that made the new state of Slovakia ineligible to join NATO with 
the rest of the V4 countries in 1999. One must also not forget the significance of 
the Yugoslav wars that helped the V4 countries prove themselves to be 
strategically sound allies to NATO and the US. The V4 countries would play a 
vital role in ending the ethnic cleansing and murderous violence that occurred in 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990’s. However it can not be stressed enough that 
no matter their proclaimed motives, the Clinton administration saw the collapse of 
the Soviet Union as a way to make NATO and the US’s military importance 
relevant again. This was an event that allowed for the US to show the world what 
it stood for, liberal internationalism, and what its role would be in the future to 
come. As discussed the US would call upon the V4 to once again take military 
action when former President George W. Bush formed the coalition of the willing 
in order to legitimize the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
With acceptance into NATO, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
were seen as legitimate Atlantic allies, which had set up politically free 
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democracies and had established working free-market economies. Acceptance 
into NATO also brought a surge of foreign investments as other countries took 
note of the political and economic achievements that the Visegrad countries had 
accomplished. This success would eventually lead all of the V4 countries to 
being accepted into the EU, bringing their acceptance into the Atlantic world full 
circle. With this thesis, I have demonstrated that the relationship between the US 
and V4 played a major role in the development of these countries after the fall of 
communism in the early 1990’s and with US aid the V4 was able to join western 
institutions. Today, we see that while the mission of Atlanticism has been 
reduced to military cooperation, the need for a more embracing Atlanticism that 
should include political and economic cooperation is still strong. With mounting 
issues, such as the 2014 crisis in Ukraine and the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, we 
see that the world needs Atlanticism now more than ever. However, if Atlanticism 
is to continue in the future, then both the US and EU need to bring the focus back 
to promoting political and economic collaboration in the forms of solving these 
kind of crisis. We see that with regards to the Syrian refugee crisis the V4 is 
united and committed to solving the root causes of the problem but are at odds 
with the European Commission, France, Germany and the Obama Administration 
on how to handle relocating refugees. For now all we can hope is that the US 
and V4, and more generally the EU, will engage with one another in order to deal 
with the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis in a peaceful and positive manner. 
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